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PROF. JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER"

When Express Clauses Bar Implied
Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas
Marketing Scenarios
I. INTRODUCTION
"We are told that [implied] Contract [law], like God, is dead," to
paraphrase Grant Gilmore.' At least, so it might appear in Texas oil and gas
law. Lessors face such difficult burdens of proof under the implied covenant
to reasonably develop that their only recourse is to protect themselves with
express provisions governing this duty.2 The implied covenant to protect
against drainage may often be gutted by the lessee's routine insertion of an
express offset clause that weakens the lessor's protection while slyly
suggesting that the lessee has promised the lessor a benefit.3 Many eulogies
to the implied covenant to market have been sung in leases where royalties
are based on market value rather than proceeds.4 And lessors, we are told,
must use self-help or other bodies of law, such as agency/principal rules,
to rescue their in-kind oil royalties from lessees who generally owe them no
implied marketing duties whatsoever.'
Are these reports of the death of implied covenant law as
exaggerated as Mark Twain's death once was? More importantly, is implied
covenant law dying an honorable death, having served the industry well for
many decades, but no longer needed in the new century, especially in gas
marketing? Its death or terminal illness is then cause for celebration rather
than mourning.
This Article seeks to answer both questions about implied covenant
law in Texas, particularly as related to a lessee's gas marketing duties. Part
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1. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH Of CONTRACT 1 (1995).
2. ERNusr E. SMITH &JACQUuNE LANG WEAVER, I TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 5.2(B),

at 255-0 (1996).
The recent invention of 3-D seismic technology may allow lessors to better arm
themselves with proof of lessees' failure to drill profitable wells, thus reinvigorating the
implied covenant to develop.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 54 and 55.
4. See infra sources cited in note 128.
5. SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 5.4(B)(2), at 281 (discussing Cook v. Tompkins, 713
S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App. 1986, no writ)). Agency/principal rules may provide even stronger
protection to lessors than implied covenant law, so lessors are not left powerless.
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II examines the general framework adopted in Texas for determining
whether a covenant should be implied in a particular conveyance and the
specific lease provisions that lessees wield as swords to vanquish implied
covenants in non-marketing contexts. Part III focuses on the implied
covenant to market and those lease clauses and division orders which
seemingly doom this covenant to extinction in Texas. The analysis in Part
IV argues that the implied covenant to market should and will continue to
play a strong role in balancing the interests of lessees and lessors in the
marketing of natural gas. Part V concludes with a look to the future at the
types of research and knowledge that oil and gas lawyers, both in practice
and in academe, will need to evaluate implied covenant claims in the
future.
II. WHEN EXPRESS CLAUSES BAR IMPLIED COVENANTS IN
THE NON-MARKETING CONTEXT
A. The Nature of Implied Covenants-Three Models and a Synthesis
From the earliest days of the oil industry, implied covenants have
played an integral role in defining the duties of a lessee under an oil and gas
lease.6 Yet the doctrinal origins of implied covenant law and its continuing
vitality and validity in light of changing public policy are still a matter of
some controversy.7 In a previous article, I canvassed this debate and
suggested that the following three models are used to resolve implied
covenant disputes:8
1. The equity model. Covenants are implied in law, primarily
to prevent unfairness to lessors. This model often presumes
the superior bargaining power of lessees: that lessors are
handed a standard printed lease form drafted by the lessee
and are simply not able to protect their interests through
negotiation. The actual language of the lease is often

6. See Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). At an early date, the
Texas Supreme Court cited Brewster approvingly as the lodestar for implied covenant
litigation in Texas. See Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 6 S.W.2d 1039
(Tex. 1928).
7. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal
Energy Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473,1485-89 (1981).
8. Id. at 1485-94. Professor A.W. Walker, Jr. contended that implied covenants in oil
and gas leases were implied in fact in Texas. See A.W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of The Property
Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEx. L REv. 399, 404 (1933). Professor
Maurice Merrill argued that such covenants are implied in law. MAURICE H. MERRILL,
COVENANTS IMPUED IN OIL AND GAS LEASEs § 220 (2d ed. 1940).
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considered as evidence of the parties' intentions, but this does
not necessarily control the outcome.
2. The contract model. Covenants are implied in fact based on
the parties' reasonable expectations, given the nature and
purpose of the specific contract and the circumstances under
which it was made.
3. The policy model. Public policy values (such as promoting
a competitive, deregulated gas market) external to the parties'
expectations or to judicial norms of equity are used to
influence the outcome of the litigation. These policy values
are most often found in legislated expressions of national or
state priorities.
Each model can rightfully claim to be fair: the first because it
explicitly considers equity; the second because fairness in private contract
law is defined as that which most closely represents the parties' intentions;
and the third because it measures fairness through norms expressed in the
political process.
Professors Williams and Meyers have synthesized the debate
between "in fact" and "in law" covenants by arguing that implied
covenants reflect the broad principle of cooperation applicable to all
contracts.9 This principle requires that the parties to an agreement cooperate
to carry out the purposes of the contract and is based upon both the
reasonable expectations of the parties and ethical norms of conduct." The
cooperation principle derives from a long history of Anglo-American
common law embodying the implication of duties of good faith and
culminating in the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code's obligation
of good faith in every contract.
Adopting the principle of cooperation as the jurisprudential basis
of implied covenant law avoids what Williams and Meyers consider the
false dichotomy of "in fact" versus "in law" covenants. These authors write:
If the principle of cooperation is accepted as the correct basis
for implying covenants, then there is an element of both fact
and law in the implication. The duty of cooperation requires
the parties to conduct themselves in such a manner as to

9. HOWARD R. WILUAMS & CHARLS J. MEYERS, 5 OIL & GAS LAW § 802.1 (1996).
10. Williams and Meyers cite the well-known case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), a fixture of most first-year contract casebooks, as illustrative of the
principle of cooperation. In this case, the grantee of an exclusive selling agency was held to
an implied promise to use best efforts to promote the sales of grantor's fashions because
grantor's compensation depended on these sales. The analogy is clear to implied covenants
in an oil and gas lease wherein lessor's royalty is dependent on lessee's diligence.
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promote the basic purposes of the contract. To this extent it is
rooted in fact, because undoubtedly parties do enter into a
contract with the expectation that conduct will be directed
towards the end of accomplishing its purposes. Undoubtedly
the principle of cooperation also represents an ethical norm;
but an ethical norm can be a fact, and can be the predicate for
reasonable expectations.
It is our conclusion that implied covenants rest on the duty of
cooperation, which is ultimately derived from the intention of
the parties but that the application of an implied covenant to
any particular dispute may properly be influenced by
concepts of proper ethical conduct."
Whichever model is adopted by the courts and commentators, there
seems to be general agreement that implied covenants are necessary in oil
and gas law to protect lessors from negligent and incompetent lessees, from
lessees who speculate, and from lessees who self-deal. Often, the difference
between the equity model and the contract model seems subsumed in the
courts' use of a standard rule that contracts are to be construed against their
drafters (that is, against lessees in an oil and gas lease transaction) when
doubt exists about the parties' intentions."2 Nonetheless, a court's choice of
the contract model versus the equity model may have real consequences.
The contract model may inhibit a court from finding an implied covenant
outside of the printed words of the contract while the equity model may
facilitate a search for such a covenant in order to promote fairness."3
In recent years, the classification debate has assumed a more
serious dimension as the courts in oil and gas producing states have split in
their approaches to interpreting the express royalty clause in an oil and gas
lease. Professor Lowe has handily classified the competing approaches as
the "plain terms" versus the "cooperative venture" jurisdictions. 4 The
dichotomy between jurisdictions arose over the meaning of "market value"
in the gas royalty clause of the typical lease. A majority of jurisdictions,
including Texas, have held that "market value" is a "plain term" with a
well-defined meaning: the price a willing buyer and seller would pay at the

WILUAMS & MES, supra note 9, § 803, at 24.
12. See Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of InterpretingMineral Deeds and Leases: An
Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction,24 TEx. TEiCH. L. Rsv. 1,103-08 (1993).
13. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 9, § 803, at 20.
14. John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation,49 SMU L. REV. 223,232-36 (1996).
11.
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time gas is produced."5 Under the "plain term" rule, lessors with market
value royalty clauses were able to reap royalties amounting to far more than
the proceeds received by lessees from their long-term sales contracts with
gas purchasers. For example, in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,"6 the lessee
had negotiated a gas sales contract in 1933 which dedicated the gas to the
pipeline purchaser at a sales price of 2.3 cents per MCF for the life of the
lease. At that time, these contract terms were the best that a reasonably
prudent operator could have obtained. By the 1960s, the price of similar gas
in the same market area had risen to about 16 cents per MCF. Under the
"plain terms" meaning of market value, the lessee owed one-eighth of the
16 cents, or almost the entire two cents received as proceeds, to the lessor
as royalty.
In contrast, the "cooperative venture" jurisdictions treated market
value as an ambiguous term and interpreted it in light of the practical
realities and customs of the industry. In these states, market value was
defined as the contract price received by the lessee, as long as this price
reflected the best terms that a reasonably prudent operator could have
obtained at the time of contracting with the gas purchaser. Thus, market
value royalties were equated to proceeds royalties. The cooperative venture
jurisdictions expressly used fairness to producers as a rationale for
interpreting the lease in this manner." In addition, these courts recognized
the "necessity of the market" which required that gas producers negotiate
sales contracts to meet their implied marketing duty to lessors at a time
when long-term sales contracts were virtually the only method of
marketing."8 These jurisdictions often outwardly acknowledged the
cooperative nature of the oil and gas lease as a relational contract in which

15.

The leading Texas case is Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968):
(The parties to the lease] might have agreed that the royalty on gas
produced from a gas well would be a fractional part of the amount realized
by the lessee from its sale. Instead of doing so, however, they stipulated in
plain terms that the lessee would pay one-eighth of the market price at the
well of all gas sold or used off the premises. This clearly means the
prevailing market price at the time of the sale or use.
Id. at 871.
16. Id. at 866.
17. See, e.g., Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269,1273 (Okla. 1981) (lessors
not entitled to have royalty calculated on the highest current price in the field because "(tihis
would not be fair to the producers").
18. Id. The court also noted that the Federal Power Commission had outlawed the use
of "most favored nations" clauses which producers had inserted into their contracts with
pipeline purchasers so that their gas sales prices would rise as the purchaser offered higher
prices in newer contracts to other producers.
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implied covenants play a pivotal role in contract interpretation, as espoused
by Williams and Meyers in the context of implied covenants."
The market value cases involve the interpretation of the express
clause of an oil and gas lease and arguably have no effect on a court's
approach to implied covenant jurisprudence." However, the consonance

19. Those cases are collected in Lowe, supra note 14 at 234-36. Some of the "cooperative
venture" courts also used equitable principles of fundamental fairness as an aid to
interpreting these leases in a manner that would not bankrupt lessees. See, e.g., Henry v.
Ballard, 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982):
Where the mineral lease provides for payment to the lessor of a fractional
royalty interest, the lease arrangement is in the nature of a cooperative
venture: the lessor contributes the land and the lessee the capital and
expertise necessary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both
parties.... The ultimate objective of the royalty provisions of a lease is to
fix the division between the lessor and lessee of the economic benefits
anticipated from the development of the minerals.
Id. at 1338.
The cooperative principle espoused by Williams and Meyers as the foundation of implied
covenant law and the cooperative venture analysis used to define market value in some
jurisdictions are similar, but not identical. The cooperative principle explains why courts
insert implied covenants into oil and gas leases: to require both parties to promote the basic
purposes of the contract. The cooperative principle is rooted in fact and derived from the
intentions of the parties, although ethical norms may influence the application of an implied
covenant. The cooperative venture analysis reasons in the reverse: because implied
covenants exist in an oil and gas lease, the express terms of a lease should be interpreted to
promote fairness between lessee and lessor and consistency with the lessee's implied duties.
20. For example, the Texas Supreme Court in Vela could have concluded that market
value meant contract price without any reference to fairness or implied covenant
jurisprudence. Indeed, four justices dissented in Vela on the basis that "market price" was
not a plain term because it failed to state at what time the market price was to be
determined. The lease did not expressly state that this price was the current or prevailing
market price of gas when produced rather than the price fixed in 1933 at the time the gas
sales contract was negotiated. The dissenting justices looked at the common practices in the
industry at the time the gas sales contract was made in 1933. At that time, all parties to the
lease knew that gas could only be marketed under long-term sales contracts. Consequently
all of the parties knew "that the term 'market price' necessarily meant the price prevailing
for gas on long-term contract as of the time the sale contract should be made." 429 S.W.2d.
at 879. The dissenting justices did not base their opinion on notions of fairness or the
cooperative nature of the oil and gas lease. They simply interpreted the contract according
to industry custom.
Section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that an agreement is to be
interpreted in accordance with relevant usage if both parties know of this usage.
Furthermore, comment d to section 220 explains that usage relevant to interpretation is part
of the context of an agreement in determining whether there is ambiguity as well as in
resolving ambiguity. Usage can be shown without a finding that ambiguity exists. Thus, the
normal effect of usage on a written contract is to vary its meaning from the meaning it would
otherwise have. These Restatement rules are independent of norms of fairness or cooperation
and could have been used to find that "market value" meant the long-term contract price.
RESATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220 (1981).
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between the "plain terms" rule of contract interpretation and the "implied
in fact" classification of implied covenants is obvious. Those jurisdictions
which have not acknowledged the equitable nature of implied covenants as
being implied in law due to the relationship between the parties may be less
likely to find that an implied covenant exists outside of the express
language in a lease, and thus will be less likely to resolve disputes over a
lessee's implied duties in favor of the lessor. The dichotomy between
implying covenants "in fact" or "in law" then becomes more than mere
"academic shadowboxing."2' For this reason, it is important to examine a
jurisdiction's choice of model in implied covenant jurisprudence.
B. The Texas Model
The Texas courts seem to have adopted the contract model that
implied covenants are implied in fact in oil and gas leases. This conclusion
is supported by the following language from DancigerOil & Refining Co. of
Texas v. Powell,' often cited as the leading case on this point:
An implied covenant must rest entirely on the presumed
intention of the parties as gathered from the terms as actually
expressed in the written instrument itself, and it must appear
that it was so clearly within the contemplation of the parties
that they deemed it unnecessary to express it, and therefore
omitted to do so, or it must appear that it is necessary to infer
such a covenant in order to effectuate the full purpose of the
contract as a whole as gathered from the written instrument.
It is not enough to say that an implied covenant is necessary
in order to make the contract fair, or that without such a
covenant it would be improvident or unwise, or that the
contract would operate unjustly. 23

The Tara majority opinion, which used fairness and industry custom as guides to
interpreting market price as the contract price, believed that its interpretation "is consonant
with the intent and understanding of parties to oil and gas leases." 630 P.2d at 1274. Viewed
in this manner, the split between jurisdictions over the meaning of market value is little more
than a difference in opinion as to the use of industry custom in interpreting contracts.
21. WILUjAsS& MEYERS, supra note 9, § 803, at 20. Indeed, the authors of this treatise use
the case of Danciger Oil & Refining Co. of Texas v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1941) to
illustrate how adoption of the contract model may inhibit courts from finding implied
covenants exist. In their opinion, the result in Dandigerwould have been harder to support,
and might even have been different, if the Texas courts believed that covenants are implied
in law. WnLLIAN &MEYEns, supranote 9, § 803 at 20- 22. In my opinion, the Dancigerresult
is well-reasoned and would not be differently decided under the equity model, as discussed
in the next part of this Article.
22. 154 S.W.2d 632.
23. Id. at 635.
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Applying this analysis to the specific contract at hand, which was
a deed rather than a lease, the court held that no implied covenant to
develop existed between the grantor/owner of a reserved royalty interest
who had deeded his mineral interest to the grantee/lessee, an oil operator.
The court carefully explained the result it reached, based on its analysis of
the contract language as a whole in light of the circumstances under which
the contract was made and the purposes sought to be accomplished by it.'
The court's analysis focused on four factors. First, the conveyance
was a deed, not a lease. This alone was not conclusive; the court clearly
recognized that implied covenants might arise from deeds.25 Second, the
grantors had received a very large cash payment up front, as is usual in a
mineral conveyance when a large cash consideration is the "moving cause"
for the grantor's conveyance of property to a grantee motivated by an
investment purpose rather than a development purpose.' Third, nothing
indicated a dominant purpose to obtain development of the tract rather
than its use for investment purposes. The contract specifically provided for
drilling offset wells to prevent drainage, but no provision was made for
drilling any other wells.' Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the
contract stated that the grantee should have "the right at any time ... to
develop such oil and gas.., subject only to the limitations and covenants
hereinafter set forth." 2' The court gave great weight to the quoted language
that evidenced an intention to exclude every covenant except those
expressly bargained for.
The only circumstance in Dancigerarguing in favor of implication
of a covenant to develop was the fact that the grantor had retained a royalty
interest in the minerals. This provision alone was not sufficient to justify
reading an implied covenant into the contract in light of the other language
and circumstances involved in the grant.
While Dancigercan fairly be characterized as the leading case on the
nature of implied covenants in Texas, it is itself premised on an earlier
Texas Supreme Court case, FreeportSulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty
Co. of Texas? In Freeport,the court also performed a careful analysis of the

24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Freeport Sulphur Company v. American Sulphur Royalty Company Co.,
6 S.W.2d 1039 (Tex. 1928), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 29-35).
26. Id. at 635-36. As a general rule, exploration and development are not considered
to be the moving factors in conveying mineral deeds. 1 WIwIAMS & MaES, supra note 9, §
205.1 (1996).
27. Danciger,154 S.W.2d at 636.

28. Id.
29. 6 S.W.2d 1039. Other early Texas cases recognizing implied covenants include Grubb
v. McAfee, 212 S.W. 464 ('rex. 1919) (oil and gas lease); Benavides v. Hunt, 15 S.W. 396 ('rex.
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language of the conveyance to determine whether an implied covenant
should exist and, if so, whether it was negated by express language. In this
case, the grantors conveyed sulfur-rich land by deed, in exchange for
$450,000 in cash, royalties based on $1.75 per ton for the first 200,000 tons
and 75 cents a ton thereafter, and an express covenant that the grantees
would erect and operate a complete plant using the Frasch process on the
land within 18 months. The grantee built the plant as promised (indeed, it
built four plants) and operated the property continuously until it shut down
operations for fourteen months in 1921 and 1922 and for several years from
1924 to the date of trial. The grantor sued to recover lost royalties for breach
of the implied covenant to reasonably develop.
The court began its analysis by proclaiming the Dancigerprinciple
that covenants may be implied only when necessary to give effect to the
intent of the parties and the purpose of the contract when viewed as a
whole, not to make the contract fair. *The court refused to surmise whether
the principal consideration for the conveyance was the $450,000 or the
royalty. Clearly, the royalty was part of the consideration, and evidently a
substantial part.31 If this consideration was to be realized, a covenant for
development and operation must exist to give effect to that part of the
contract. This implied covenant would exist in a deed for solid minerals just
as in a lease of fugacious oil and gas.
The court then negated the existence of the implied covenant to
develop by finding that the express clause requiring one Frasch plant
barred this implied covenant. 2 The grantor/royalty owners argued that this
provision applied only to the construction of a test plant (that is, to
exploratory operations) and was not intended to bar a separate duty to
develop. However, the court found nothing to indicate that the duty was to
operate a test plant. Indeed, the language indicated that the plant had
already been tested in Louisiana under the Frasch patent which had now
expired.
However, this same language requiring construction of one plant
carried the necessary implication of an implied covenant for continuous
operation of the plant in order to realize the bargained-for royalties: "The
parties having contracted for development, an implied covenant exists for
diligent operation for the best advantage and benefit of both."f3

1891) (coal lease); and J.M. Gufjly Petroleum Co. v. effChoaison Townsite Co., 107 S.W. 609 (rex.
Civ. App. 1907).
30. Freeport Sulphur, 6 S.W.2d at 1041. The court recognized that the customs and
practices of the business to which the contract relates may be considered in this analysis.
31. Id. at 1043.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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The grantee/operator then argued that its decision to operate or to
shut down the plant was wholly within its judgment and sound discretion,
as long as it acted in good faith without fraud. The operator contended
that the $450,000 cash payment and the large cost of constructing a plant
were sufficient assurance to the royalty owners that sulfur would be
produced, because the sulfur company had such large amounts of capital
invested in the property that its self-interest would protect the royalty
owners. The court disagreed. The correct rule was that enunciated in
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., the reasonably prudent operator standard
requiring reasonable diligence rather than mere good faith.' The supreme
court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
sulfur company had acted as a reasonably prudent operator in suspending
production.
A third key case forms the triad of early Texas Supreme Court cases
on the nature of implied covenants in oil and gas law. In Cowden v. Broderick
& Calvert, Inc.,' the court specifically addressed the issue of how to
interpret lease clauses that appear to negate implied covenants. The lease
in question contained a clause reading: "In the event of production on
adjoining land, the lessee agrees to drill proper and necessary offsets along
property lines; lessor agrees that all other development shall be at the
discretion of the lessee. "37
The court reasoned that this express development clause barred the
implied covenant to develop with reasonable diligence that ordinarily
would have arisen after the discovery of oil. 8 However, the express clause
did not bar application of a good faith standard to protect the lessor's
interest in development. The court analyzed the quoted lease provision as
follows:
The lessor, in agreeing that all other development should be
at the discretion of the lessee, did not leave the development
to the complete option of the lessee and his assigns, to
develop or not to develop at their pleasure. 'At the discretion
of' may, under some circumstances, mean 'at the option of,'

34. Id.
35. Id. at 1044. The Texas court quoted the correct rule from Brewster. "Whatever, in the
circumstances, would be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having
regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required." An earlier Texas case
had also rejected the good faith standard in implied covenant law, explaining that "[t]he
'man on the spot' may be an expert and use his best judgment; yet he may be negligent or
otherwise fall short of what the circumstances require." Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d
872, 874, on mot.for reh'g, 10 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).
36. 114 S.W.2d 1166 (Tex. 1938).
37. Id. at 1168.
38. Id. at 1170-71.
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but usually it does not. Discretion differs from uncontrolled
will .... 'Discretion means the equitable decision of what is
just and proper under the circumstances.' . .. [or the]
'freedom to act according to honest judgment' and that
discretion as used in the law was not 'a word for arbitrary
will or inconsiderate action' [citations omitted] A construction
of the lease that would leave further development to the
option or uncontrolled will of the lessee and his assigns
should be avoided, because it would tend to prevent the
accomplishment of the purpose for which the lease was made,
that is the production of oil and gas with payment of royalty
to the lessor.39
The supreme court remanded the case to the district court for trial
under the good faith standard. The court's reasoning in this case seems to
blur the line between the contract model based on "necessity," which asks
what covenants would necessarily be implied in fact, and the equity model.
The court was clearly reluctant to free the lessee from any judicial controls
over its decisionmaking despite language strongly suggesting that this was
the parties' intent.
The equity and the contract models will often result in the same
analysis, as recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in another leading
opinion in implied covenant jurisprudence:
Contractual implications are justified only on the ground of
necessity .... Mr. Merrill suggests that the true basis of the
whole doctrine of implied covenants in oil and gas leases may
be found in the determination of courts to enforce fair dealing
between lessor and lessee which could not otherwise be
assured .... While necessity and fair dealing alike require the
implication of the obligation by the lessee in leases such as the
one now before the court for reasonable diligence in oil and
gas exploration, development, and production, yet neither
necessity nor fair dealing requires the further implication that
such obligation shall operate as a limitation on the estate
acquired by the lessee.7
In sum, implied covenants in Texas seem to be implied in fact under
the contract model. However, the leading cases still often discuss fair
dealing and good faith in language reminiscent of the equity model. In
addition, even under the contract model, express language that might bar
implied covenants is read narrowly. In Freeport Sulphur, the express
language was interpreted to bar only the covenant to develop, not the

39. Id. at 1171.
40. W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27,31-32 (Tex. 1929).
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covenant to operate; and in Cowden, the express language of "discretion"
did not bar a trial to determine whether the lessee had acted in good faith.
These two cases demonstrate the guiding principles established at an early
date in the interpretation of express clauses which purport to bar implied
covenants: First, that the express clause must be very clear, and second, that
the language of the lease should be construed against its drafter, the lessee,
whenever its meaning is doubtful. As Professor A. W. Walker writes, after
acknowledging that covenants are implied in fact in Texas:
In order to prevent the implication of these covenants.. .the
intention of the parties to that effect must be indicated very
clearly in the lease. This follows as a matter of course from the
very theory upon which the implication of these covenants is
justified. If the reservation of royalties contingent upon
production indicates that the parties intended these implied
duties to exist, and their implication is deemed necessary to
effectuate the purpose for which the lease was executed, it is
apparent that they will be implied in all leases wherein a
royalty of this type is reserved unless the intention of the
parties otherwise clearly appears.41
Because covenants are implied in fact, it also follows that the
implied duties are as strong as any express duties in the lease; the implied
duties are necessary to fulfill the purposes of the lease. In Texas Co. v.
Ramsower, the court wrote: "The implied obligation.., is as much a part of
the contract as if expressly stated. The fact that the obligation rests in
implication and not in words may have an important bearing on remedies
and their enforcement, but not in respect to rights otherwise."'
In all of these early cases, the court performed a careful analysis of
the language of the contract as a whole considered in light of the
circumstances in which it was made. The cases set a strong foundation of
rational analysis to apply to future disputes between operators and royalty
owners. The next sections of this part of the Article survey the Texas cases
which discuss when express language in a contract is strong enough to bar
specific implied covenants.
C. The Implied Covenant to Drill an Initial Well
The well-settled rule regarding application of implied covenants is
that when a contract contains an express covenant on a subject, no implied

41. Walker, supranote 8, at 407-08.
42. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872, 874 (rex. Comm'n App. 1928).
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covenant can exist as to the same subject. Under this rule, the delay rental
clause in the modem lease expressly bars the implied covenant to drill an
initial well on a leasehold." The delay rental clause was created to avoid the
dissatisfaction experienced by both lessees and lessors with the earliest lease
forms. These forms had long fixed terms that ended even if the lessee had
secured production. Moreover, the lessee was not assured that the lease
would last the fixed term because courts implied a covenant to drill an
exploratory well within a reasonable time.'
Despite its seemingly plain language, the delay rental clause does
not bar the implied covenant to drill offset wells to protect against drainage
even when the'offset well would be the first well drilled on the tract." The
Texas courts have held that the delay rental clause is not inconsistent with
the drainage covenant; each acts independently for a different purpose. The
delay rental clause was adopted to displace the duty to drill an initial
exploratory well, not the duty to protect against drainage .'
Furthermore, in Texas, the lessor's acceptance of delay rentals with
knowledge of drainage, does not bar the lessor from bringing suit for breach
of the offset covenant.' In this regard, Texas differs from the majority of
jurisdictions which hold that such lessors who accept delay rentals with
knowledge of drainage are barred from bringing suit during the period

43. 5 WILuAMS & MEYERS, supra note 9, § 826; MERRILL, supra note 8, § 6; 5 EUGENE
KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 55.2 (1994). See, e.g., Simms Oil Co. v.

Flewellen, 156 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1941) (opinion adopted by Texas Supreme
Court, 1941).
44. The modern "unless' lease form basically reads 'upon payment of delay rentals,
commencement of drilling operations may be deferred.' Under an "or' form of lease, the
lessee promises to either drill or pay delay rentals. See generally,5 WILLAms & MEYERS, Supra
note 9, §§ 811 -13; McCallister v. Texas Co., 223 S.W. 859 (Tex. App. 1920, writ ref'd).
45. 3 WILLIAMS& MEYERS, supranote 9, §§ 601.1-.4. The early "no term' lease which
allowed the lessee to extend the lease indefinitely with the payment of delay rentals was so

successfully attacked by lessors in court that it also fell from use. Under both the long fixedterm lease and the no-term lease, courts held that the lessee had an implied duty to drill an

exploratory well within a reasonable time. Both leases failed to provide certainty as to the
rights of the parties to the lease. The modem delay rental clause, coupled with the fixed,
relatively short, primary term in the habendum clause of the lease, unequivocally gives the
lessee the right to delay drilling an initial well if he so chooses.

46. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872 (delay rental clause refers to an initial exploratory or
development well to be drilled at the will of the lessee and does not relate to the subject
matter of the drainage covenant; the two covenants include different subjects).
47. See generally, 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 9, § 826.2; Will Mann Richardson,

Doctrineof Development Covenants Re-examined in Light of Express Covenantsand Conseration
Orders, 9 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 321, 325 (1958).
48. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872.
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covered by the rental payment, based on theories of waiver, estoppel or
election of remedies.4" The Texas position is the better reasoned one.
The delay rental cases, which differentiate initial wells from offset
wells, illustrate the principle that an express clause may supersede an
implied covenant, but only to the extent that the express provision is in
actual conflict with the implied duty.
D. The Implied Covenant to Protect Against Drainage
At an early date, the courts imposed on lessees the implied
covenant to protect the leasehold against the ultimate loss of hydrocarbons
resulting from drainage to another leasehold,. Unlike solid minerals, oil
and gas migrate underground in response to pressure differentials caused
by well drilling. Reasonable prudent operators must protect their lease lines
against this migration.
Following the general rule, an express lease provision dealing
explicitly with the obligation to drill offset wells will normally displace the
implied covenant to the extent the express clause is inconsistent with the
implied covenant.51 The inconsistency must be clear. Broad clauses stating
that the lessee has no obligation to drill or has no obligation to develop
either before or after the discovery of oil or gas do not bar the implied
covenant to protect against drainage5 2 As one court stated:
It is true that drilling an offset well is in a sense developing
the property. But the implied covenant to drill offset wells..
. is a distinct obligation from the obligation imposed by the
implied covenant to develop the property ....The express
stipulation against, or the full performance of, the obligation
of the lessee to develop the property will not relieve the
obligation to prevent drainage.'
Most leases contain a provision similar to the following (although
the offset distance may vary): "In the event a well producing in paying
quantities is brought in an adjacent land and within 330 feet of and draining
the leased premises, Lessee agrees to drill such offset wells as a reasonably

49. 5 WILLIAMs & MEYS supranote 9, §826.2.
50. See, e.g., Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (Tex. 1928).
51. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYts, supra note 9, § 826.3.
52. J.M. Guffey v. Jeff Chaison Townsite Co., 107 S.W. 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no
writ); Stanolind Oil &Gas Co. v. Christian, 83 S.W.2d 408 (rex. App. 1935, writ ref'd); Brown
v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1943); Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
See generally, 5 KuNrz, supranote 43, § 61.2 (1994).
53. Stano/ind Oil & Gas, 83 S.W.2d at 409. The lease at issue contained a clause reading:
'There shall be no express or IMPUED obligation on the part of lessee to develop said
premises for oil, gas or other minerals, either before or after discovery thereof .... '
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prudent operator would drill." This express provision mimics the implied
covenant to protect against drainage which requires a lessee to drill an
offset well when the lessor has proved substantial drainage and that a
reasonably prudent operator would drill such a well (that is, when the well
would be profitable to drill).
It can be argued, then, that this express provision should have no
effect on the implied covenant that it mimics. The lessee has committed to
act as a reasonably prudent operator when offset wells are drilled within
the specified distance from the lease line; and since the typical lease is silent
as to the lessee's duty to offset a well beyond the express distance stated in
the lease, the implied duty would continue to exist here as well. The typical
express offset clause does not state that the lessee will protect against
drainage only if wells are drilled within 330 feet of the lease line.s' Yet, the
general rule appears to be that the typical express provision will bar the
implied offset covenant to protect against an adjoining well brought in more
than 330 feet away, even if the well is draining the lease premises.ss Thus,
the express covenant to protect against wells drilled within 330 feet of the
lease line is interpreted as displacing the implied covenant to protect
against wells both within and outside the 330-foot distance.
While often stated as a general rule, few cases exist on point. This
may reflect the self-interest of lessees in protecting their lease lines from
drainage by rival operators no matter what distance the offset well.
However, it probably also reflects recognition by Texas lessees that the
express provision is strongly disfavored by the Texas courts which have
narrowed the ambit of protection it accords lessees against the implied
covenant duty in two major ways.
First, the Texas courts have reached the rather curious result that
the typical express offset covenant bars the implied, but only during the
primary term. After the primary term expires, the implied covenant duty
reappears.'s This result was premised on the then-existing case law which

54. Charles Meyers has argued that 'from the standpoint of grammar and logic," the
clear meaning of the typical express clause is that it bars any implied duty to protect against
drainage from wells outside the offset distance. Charles Meyers, The Effect of Express
Provisionsin an Oil and Gas Lease on Implied Obligations,14 L..U. MIN. L. INST. 90,108 (1967).
In restating his position in the treatise, Meyers writes: 'The logical inference that must be
drawn from a clause that obliges the operator to drill offsets only as to wells within (say) 150
feet from lease boundaries is that he is not obliged to drill offsets to wells more than 150 feet
away.' 5 WiLIAMs & Msysts, supranote 9, § 826.3, at 206. 1 would agree with his logic if the
typical express clause contained the word 'only,' but it does not.
55. R. HEMINGWAY, LAw OF OIL AND GAs § 8.6 (3d ed. 1991); 5 KUNTZ, supra note 43, §
61.2 (1994).
56. See, for example, Coats v. Brown, 301 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. App. 1957); Chapman v. Sohio
Petroleum Co., 297 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App. 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Page, 141 S.W.2d 691 (rex. App. 1956, writ ref'd), all of which rely on Humble Oil & Refining
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held that acceptance of delay rentals barred the implied covenant to protect
against drainage. In 1929, the Texas courts reversed this premise in Texas
Co. v. Ramsower, as discussed above. After Ramsower, if the express clause
is effective at any time during the life of the lease, it should be effective at
all times. Yet the Texas courts, even after 1929, continue to hew to the old
rule that limits the effectiveness of the express clause to the primary term
of the lease.
Moreover, it is difficult to find a Texas case that directly states that
the typical express offset clause bars the implied protection covenant.
Hemingway's treatise cites four Texas appellate cases as support for the
general rule, but none of the four interprets the typical clause. 7 Williams
and Meyers' treatise states that only one reported Texas case was found
where the typical express clause was used to deny recovery to a lessor, and
in this case, an alternate ground was also relied on.'
Secondly, the Texas courts have held that the express offset clause
is not effective to bar the implied covenant to protect against drainage at all
in a "common lessee" situation s In a per curiam decision refusing a writ
of error in Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, the Texas Supreme Court wrote:
The Court of Civil Appeals correctly held that the express
provision in the Stansbury lease which obligated Shell to drill
an offset well if a draining well was within a specified
distance from the Stansbury property line did not limit Shell's

Co. v. Strauss,243 S.W. 528 (rex. App. 1922). The historical analysis of these cases is treated
in detail in 5 WILLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 9, § 826.3.
57. HWNGWAY, supra note 55, § 8.6, at 565 n.80 (citing Burt v. Deorsam, 227 S.W. 354
(rex. App. 1921, writ denied) (offset clause required lessee to drill regardless of expected
profitability if well producing at least 50 barrels of oil a day for 30 consecutive days was
brought in on adjacent land); Wolter v. Houston Oil Co., 74 S.W.2d 706 (rex. App. 1934, no
writ) (offset clause did not contain an express distance; issue involved whether offset well
had been drilled on "adjoining lands"); Page, 141 S.W.2d 691 (typical express offset clause
accompanied by clause that "the judgment of the lessee, when not fraudulently exercised
... shall be conclusive"); Coats, 301 S.W.2d 932 (same)).
58. 5 WILUAMS & MEYERS, supra note 9, $826.3, at 207 n.24 (citing Hutchins v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 161 S.W.2d 571 (rex. App. 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.)). The court in Hutchins
denied recovery to the lessor primarily because the lessor had not proved the profitability
of drilling an additional well on one lease. However, the court also cited two other grounds
for denial. first, that the lessor had accepted delay rentals on the second tract at issue; and
second, that the express offset clause barred the protection covenant. Hutchins actually
involved a "common lessee" situation. In a subsequent case, the Texas Supreme Court wrote
that"[w]e specifically disapprove any language in the opinion of Hutchins... which conflicts
with the principle that a lessee is under a duty to protect his lessor against depletion of the
lessor's minerals by the affirmative act of the lessee upon adjacent land." Shell Oil Co. v.
Stansbury, 410 S.W.2d 187,188 (rex. 1966)(per curiam).
59. A "common lessee" situation occurs where an operator has leased two adjoining
tracts and has drilled a well on one tract which is draining its own lessor on the other tract.
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obligation to drill when Shell was the one causing the
drainage to the Stansbury land.'
This brief per curiam opinion does not explain why the "common
lessee" situation should be treated differently from the "rival operator"
scenario for purposes of allowing an express clause to bar an implied
covenant. However, one reason is obvious: the lessee who is being drained
by a rival operator's well is self-motivated to drill an offset well to prevent
the drainage of the lessee's own working interest in the oil or gas. The lessor
may be losing her '/ royalty oil due to drainage from the rival well, but the
lessee is losing the other 7/. This incentive is lacking when the lessee is
draining itself from operations on adjoining land. Indeed, the lessee would
prefer to drill only one well and drain two tracts at once rather than drill
two wells.
Under the equity model of implied covenant law, a court may feel
free to interpret, indeed ignore the express language of an offset clause in
order to achieve a fair result. Similarly, it is difficult to view the lease as a
cooperative venture and yet allow the lessee to drain its own lessor,
shielded by an express offset clause drafted by the lessee. Arguably, even
under the contract model, the lessor would not expect that its own lessee
would be the one draining the tract and robbing the lessor of the royalty
that is the primary consideration for the lease. Also arguably, the conflict of
interest or self-dealing which arises in a common lessee situation is not
within the contemplation of the parties to the lease. In Amoco ProductionCo.
v. Alexander, the Texas Supreme Court frankly acknowledged that "[t]he
conflicts of interest of Amoco, as a common lessee, cause us concern," 6' in
a case involving the implied covenant to protect against drainage. Certainly
it is difficult to view the lease as a cooperative venture and yet allow the
lessee to drain its own lessor, shielded by an express offset clause drafted
by the lessee.
The appellate court in Stansbury had interpreted an express offset
clause that differed slightly from the typical one. The clause required that
the lessee drill offset wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill if
wells were brought in an adjacent land "within offset distance as fixed by

60. 410 S.W.2d at 188 (denying the writ of error brought in Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury,
401 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App. 1966)). See also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563
(Tex. 1981) (affirming that an express offset provision does not limit the lessee's offset
covenant when the lessee is causing the drainage).
61. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander,622 S.W.2d at 569. See also Amoco Prod. Co. v. First
Baptist Church of Pyote, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980) (common lessee breached the implied
covenant to market by receiving collateral benefits for itself which were not shared with one
set of lessors).
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the spacing rules of any governmental regulatory body" and if drainage
was occurring. In interpreting this clause, the appellate court wrote:
A lessor and lessee may contract so that lessee is never under
obligation to drill an offset well. To so contract, however, the
language must be very clear. In this lease there is no contract
that lessee shall not be under obligation to drill an offset well.
The offset clause under consideration recognized that under
the Statewide Field Rules no maximum offset distance had
been fixed but that in the future governmental authority
could have a rule fixing a maximum offset distance. There
being no offset distance fixed by any governmental authority,
Shell was obligated to drill such offset wells as a reasonably
prudent operator would drill under the same or similar
circumstances on the Stansbury land to protect it from
drainage whether it owned leases on adjoining land or not.'
The appellate court held that a spacing rule prohibiting the drilling
of a well within 330 feet of a property line did not establish an "offset
distance;" therefore the express clause was not effective to bar the implied
covenant duty.
The appellate court's analysis is indicative of the judicial reluctance
to find that the express offset clause bars an implied covenant. The clause
smacks of unfairness. Most landowners who read the clause would think
that it acts to their benefit by imposing an additional duty on the lessee,
when in reality the provision decreases the lessor's protection if interpreted
as a bar to any duty to protect from draining wells beyond the specified
distance. For this reason, Professor Meyers has argued persuasively that the
courts should not allow the express offset clause to negate the implied
covenant.' The courts have often adopted his view in the common lessee
situation."
If courts were to adopt the equity model of implied covenants, they
could easily hold that the typical express offset clause should not bar the
implied covenant in non-common lessee cases as well. Even under the
contract model, which is so firmly rooted in the intent of the parties as
reflected by their writings, it can be argued that the typical express offset
provision should not be given effect because it does not clearly negate the
implied offset covenant. It does not say that the lessee will protect against

62. 401 S.W.2d at 630-31.
63. Meyers, supra note 54, at 107-10 ("The courts should be unmasking the wolf, not
helping him keep his sheep's clothing neatly in place"), also appearingin 5 WILUAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 9, § 826.3.
64. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 569; Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th
Cir. 1970) (involving Louisiana lease), reh'g denied, 435 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1970).
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drainage only from wells drilled closer than a specified distance. 65 In
Professor Merril's view, the express provision simply sets a minimum
standard as to the distance within which drainage is presumed to occur. A
lessor would have to prove that drainage is taking place if the rival well is
beyond the offset distance," but the express clause would not be an
absolute bar to such a cause of action.
Moreover, the differences between the "common lessee" scenario
and the "rival operator" scenario may not be so large as to justify different
treatment. In the common lessee situation, if the operator does not drill an
offset well and has no other wells on a tract, the operator risks losing the
lease on this tract under the habendum clause of the lease. 7 Thus, the
common lessee may often be self-motivated to drill the offset well. The
inherent unfairness of the express clause in either situation remains the
same.
Furthermore, the "common lessee" situation is fairly common.
Lessees often seek to aggregate numerous tracts into large leased blocks.'
Since this is a common practice, lessors presumably know of the risks of
signing a lease with an express offset clause in it. Arguably then,
jurisdictions like Texas which do not allow the express clause to bar the
implied covenant in common lessee drainage cases are, in reality, adopting
the equity model of implied covenant jurisprudence rather than the contract
model. Put simply, why should lessors be protected against self-dealing
lessees in a common lessee situation but not against negligent or
incompetent lessees in a rival operator scenario, when the express offset
clause is so poorly worded to alert lessors to its consequences and its
inherent unfairness?'

65. Some courts have held that the express offset clause bars the implied covenant to
offset in a common lessee situation, but then have created a separate and distinct implied
covenant described as a lessee's duty to protect the interests of the lessor against depletion
of the lessor's lands by the affirmative act of the lessee upon adjacent property. See, for
example, Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 48 So. 2d 344 (1950), and other cases cited in
HEMINGWAY, supra note 55, § 8.7.
66. Maurice H. Merrill, Lease Clauses Affecting Implied Covenants, 2 INST. ON OIL & GAS
L. & TAX'N 141,173 (1951).
67. Of course, if the two commonly held leases contain pooling clauses, the lessee may
combine the two tracts under this clause and hold both leases with one well. In this case,
both lessors will receive a fair share of production from the one well; neither will suffer
drainage. Some courts have suggested that reasonably prudent operators may have a duty
to pool as part of the implied covenant to protect against drainage. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d
563; Williams, 432 F.2d 165.
68. 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 9, at 98-99 (explaining "block" and "block
leases").
69. As a final note, the per curiam opinion by the Texas Supreme Court in Stansbury,
quoted supra text accompanying note 60, is carefully worded to apply only to the common
lessee situation whereas the appellate court stated that it would not allow the express offset
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E. The Implied Covenant to Develop
All jurisdictions impose the reasonably prudent operator standard
on lessees to develop the leased tract diligently7° The delay rental clause
bars the implied duty to drill a first well (absent drainage), during the
primary term of the lease, whether the well is an exploratory or a
development well.' In other words, the development covenant arises only
after initial production is obtained. n
Many leases contain a shut-in royalty clause that allows the lessee
to hold a lease in effect even though the wells on the lease are not
producing. A typical clause reads that "where gas from a gas well is not
being sold, lessee may pay as royalty - dollars per year and upon such
payment, it will be considered that gas is being produced under the
habendum clause of this lease.""
Does a shut-in gas royalty clause displace the implied development
covenant? No cases appear to exist, but it should not. Shut-in royalties are
paid as a substitute for production to preserve the lease under its
habendum clause, not as a substitute for drilling operations. 4
An express clause can bar the implied development covenant if it
is interpreted as reflecting the parties' intent to embody the entire
development obligation. Thus, in GulfProduction Co. v. Kishi," an express
provision for drilling 12 wells on a 150-acre tract and six more wells on a 20acre tract was held to define the entire development obligation, leaving no
room for the implied covenant. However, in Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v.

clause to bar the implied covenant whether or not the lessee was causing the drainage,
quoted supra text accompanying note 62. By negative inference, then, the Texas Supreme
Court arguably did not approve of the appellate court's broader statement. However, the
appellate court's rationale that express language barring any obligation to drill offsets must
be "very clear' is well-supported in the case law discussed throughout this Article. Given
the paucity of cases that purport to support the general rule that the typical express offset
clause bars the implied protection covenant, see supra text accompanying notes 56- 57, any
negative inference is quite weak.
70. The Texas Supreme Court recognized the implied covenant to develop as early as
1891 in a coal lease in Benavides v. Hunt, 15 S.W. 396 (rex. 1891) and applied this law to an
oil and gas lease as early as 1919 in Grubb v. McAfee, 212 S.W. 464 (Tex. 1919).
71. Link v. State's Oil Corp., 229 S.W. 693 (rex. App. 1921).
72. Coats v. Brown, 301 S.W.2d 932 (rex. App. 1957).
73. 3 WILUAMS & MEYES, supra note 9, § 631.
74. 5 Williams & Meyers, supra note 9, § 835.2.
75. 103 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937). See also J.M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Jeff
Chaison Townsite Co., 107 S.W. 609 (rex. Civ. App. 1908) (express clause requiring lessee
to pay minimum royalties of $400 per month, calculated at an above-market price on a 5.27acre lease, held to bar obligation to drill other wells at a time of excess capacity in the oil
field).

Spring 1997]

BARRING IMPLIED COVENANTS

Masterson,' an express provision to drill six wells on 40,000 acres in a short
time period after the lease was executed was interpreted as a provision to
speed up the implied covenant to reasonably develop, not to displace it."
Any other interpretation would "give ear to the absurd."'
79 the lease stated that
In a third case, Hull v. MagnoliaPetroleum Co.,
the grantee was "not under obligation to nor compelled to commence or
drill any well or wells or conduct any character of operations on the land
herein described during the term of this grant," except to protect the land
from drainage. The lease contained about 6,000 acres and the lessee had
drilled two producing wells. The court narrowly construed this express
development clause to apply only to the primary term of the lease, and not
to the lease's extension by production in paying quantities.
The court's reasoning focused on the "principal apparent purpose"
of the parties to a lease; this purpose being the development of the lease for
oil and gas. 0 To construe the word "term" to apply to lease extensions
beyond the ten-year primary term would render the lease self-contradictory
and nullify another provision in the lease that operations extending the
grant beyond ten years "must be prosecuted with reasonable diligence."
The court's analysis again demonstrates the judicial disfavor for express
clauses purporting to bar covenants implied to accomplish the very purpose
of the lease.
The most interesting oil and gas case under the development
covenant is W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co.' The lease in this case
required that the lessee pay annual rentals of $100,000 a year for the life of
the lease, provided that "each producing well shall hold 2,000 acres in a
square, said well to be the center, and said 2,000 acres shall be released as
to further annual rental."82 The lease was to remain in force for five years
and as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced from the land. Clearly,
this lease did not contain the typical "unless" delay rental clause which
normally bars any implied covenant to drill an initial well on a leasehold.
The annual rental payment of $100,000 was an absolute obligation of the
lessee, which could be reduced by the 2,000-acre proviso, but which coexisted with any royalties paid from production for the life of the lease.
The issue in Waggoner was whether this express clause barred the
implied development covenant as to a particular 3,000-acre tract of the
85,000-acre lease. The lessee had drilled two wells on this 3,000 acres. The

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959).
Id. at 323.
Id.
119 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 314 U.S. 575 (1941).
Id. at 125.
19 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1929).
Id. at 28.
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court of civil appeals had construed this clause as discharging the lessee
from any further obligation to develop each 2,000-acre block containing a
producing well at its center, at least for the five years of the primary term
of the lease.'s
The Texas Supreme Court did not agree with this construction. It
would "do violence to what all parties plainly intended should we interpret
this lease in such manner as to absolve the lessee or his assigns from the
duty of reasonable development after proving that the 3,000 acres contained
oil in paying quantities."84After the two wells were brought in, no revenue
whatever was to be derived from the land thereby released from rental
payments save through royalties. The principal consideration for a lease is
royalties, and to accomplish the "manifest intention of the parties," the law
implies a duty to reasonably develop.0 The supreme court ignored the fact
that this particular lease provided for annual delay rentals of $100,000 in
addition to royalties.
The supreme court did not analyze the 2,000-acre provision beyond
the reasoning described above. It seemed to be "plainly" obvious to the
court that such a provision was not intended to bar the implied covenant to
develop as to each 2,000-acre block." The expense of drilling merely earned
the lessee the right to reduce rentals on certain acreage, but did not affect
the implied covenant to drill additional wells on this acreage if profitable
to do so.
Yet it is not so plainly obvious why this proviso should not have
barred the development covenant during the primary term. The appellate
court interpreted the clause as follows:
We think this stipulation means that [lessee] might have held
the entire 85,000 acres for the full term of five years by
drilling to production one well on each 2,000 acres within the
term, because as a whole, the agreement binds the lessee to
pay rental at the rate of $1.18 per acre until a producing well
is found, and after that that particular 2,000 acres is released
from the further payment of rent. The reasonable inference
from this provision is that the parties contemplated that the
royalties from one producing well upon every 2,000 acres
would, at least during the term of the lease, equal or exceed
the annual rent, and it was inserted to induce appellant to

83. Id.
84. Id. at 29.
85. Id.
86. One oil well can usually drain oil from about 40 acres, and a gas well can drain
about 640 acres. Thus, two oil wells on 3,000 acres would not fully develop the acreage.
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drill at least one well on each 2,000 acres, thereby testing
within the five years the whole area covered by the lease."
The court of civil appeals declined to pass on the issue of whether
the 2,000-acre proviso barred any further implied duty to develop after the
first five years. In contrast, the supreme court unequivocally stated that this
provision did not bar the implied duty to develop either during or after the
primary term.88 The appellate court construction of the provision seems
correct. A strong argument can be made, then, that such a rental provision
does bar the implied duty during the primary term of the lease when
considered in light of all the circumstances and the language of this
particular lease taken as a whole. The Waggoner lease was dated 1919 and
covered wildcat, unexplored territory. The annual cash rentals were a
substantial consideration. Indeed, for a lease of wildcat territory, the cash
rentals were arguably the principal consideration, not royalties from risky
exploratory drilling which commonly result in dry holes. 9
The Texas Supreme Court's willingness to interpret express
development clauses as "starter" provisions, or minimums, seems at odds
with the approach of some appellate courts in offset cases where the typical
express offset clause (in a non-common lessee situation) is said to bar the
implied covenant rather than to establish a minimum obligation, at least
during the primary term.
One final case involving a coal lease contrasts strangely with the oil
and gas precedents discussed here. In DallasPower & Light Co. v. Cleghom
the Texas Supreme Court held that the following provision in a no-term coal
lease barred implication of any duty to develop within a reasonable time:
It is understood between the parties hereto that this lease
shall not be forfeited for any failure to prosecute mining
operations.., nor shall any forfeiture be claimed or enforced
for the breach of any implied covenant, but the title to the
minerals in said land hereby leased shall not revert to First

87. Sigler Oil Co. v. W.T. Waggoner Estate, 276 S.W. 936, 940 (Tex. App. 1925).
88. 19 S.W.2d at 29.
89. The lessee had expended $150,000 in exploration before the suit was brought. It had
drilled four wells on the 3,000 acres, two of which were producing oil in paying quantities,
but not yet enough to cover all of lessee's costs. Eight dry wells had been drilled within a
radius of 1 miles of the initial well. 276 S.W.2d at 940.
One obvious interpretation of this provision would hold that the express rental provision
barred any implied covenant to drill exploratory wells in new areas of the 85,000-acre lease,
but did not bar the implied covenant to drill development wells near wells found to be
productive. However, Texas does not recognize an implied covenant to explore separate
from the implied covenant to develop. Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959); Sun Oil
Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989).
90. 623 S.W.2d 310 (rex. 1981).
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Party [lessor] or his assigns so long as the annual rentals as
herein provided for are being paid ....
As long as Second Party [lessee] pays to First Party the lease
rentals herein specified... Second Party shall have, and he is
hereby granted, the exclusive right to... such premises....""
The court cited both Danciger and FreeportSulphur Co. as support for
its summary judgment in favor of lessee. The court stated that the provision
had a "plain meaning" and that the words used were clear.'
Yet the words had hardly seemed clear to the appellate court which
had reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the lessee. The
coal leases lacked a primary term and allowed the lessees to hold the leases
indefinitely with no exploration or development, merely by payment of
nominal annual rentals.93 The appellate court traced the historical reluctance
of Texas courts to accept these "no term" leases." Such leases had either
been invalidated for want of mutuality or, in more recent times, interpreted
them to require that the lessee comply with an implied duty to develop
within a reasonable time." Given this precedent, the appellate court in
Cleghorn found that the express clause did not bar an implied covenant to
develop within a reasonable time.
The usual remedy for breach of the implied covenant is damages
or a conditional decree to perform rather than outright forfeiture. Thus, the
court reasoned that the functional purpose of the express clause in the "no
term" lease was to prohibit forfeiture without precluding the other, more
common, remedies for breach. The clause did not specifically define the
lessee's duty to develop as had the leases in Kishi or Freeport Sulphur.
Indeed, the appellate court found that the cited cases supported the lessor's
position rather than the lessee's.
The supreme court opinion in Cleghorn does not explain why the
language in this express clause is so clear as to bar the implied covenant.
Also, there is no evidence in the court opinion regarding the amount of
bonus or rentals paid to the lessors as consideration for the right to delay
development indefinitely under a "no term" lease. Three supreme court
justices concurred in the majority opinion on the basis that coal production

91.
92.

Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.

93.

Cleghorn v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 611 S.W.2d 893, 894, rev'd, 623 S.W.2d 310

(Tex. 1981). Two of the thirteen coal leases at issue did have primary terms, and as to these,
the appellate court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of lessee.
94. Id. at 896-97.
95. Id. at 896. See also Weed v. Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, 574 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.
App. 1978) for additional history and precedents.
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and use are so different from oil and gas drilling and production that
implied covenants in oil and gas leases may not even be applicable to coal
leases." Because of the nature of the coal industry, long delays in coal
production may well be within the contemplation of the parties to a coal
lease.'
If oil and gas jurisprudence is to be applied to coal leases, the
appellate opinion in Caeghorn is better grounded in such precedent than the
supreme court opinion." As we have seen, express clauses that purport to
bar implied covenants are to be construed narrowly. Most authorities agree
that a covenant to develop should be implied in no-term leases that contain
m " Without such an implication, the lease becomes a
delay rental clauses.
mineral deed, contrary to the fundamental purpose of a lease that is
developing the mineral reserves. Professor Walker's careful analysis of the
seminal Texas cases on the nature of the property interest in oil and gas
leases concluded that Texas had adopted the view that the lessee under a
no-term lease could pay delay rentals, but only for a reasonable time; after
such time, the lessor could demand development."° The supreme court
opinion in Cleghorn is contrary to this established body of oil and gas law.
F.

Other Controls over Lessee Discretion

In numerous other instances, the courts have construed leases to
constrain the lessee's discretion. Two examples make the point. First, the
typical pooling clause is replete with the lessee's discretionary power to
pool "at its option," or, when "in Lessees judgment it is advisable to do so;"
or, when it is "in the judgment of Lessee to promote conservation;" and,
further, Lessee "may at its election exercise its pooling option after

96. 623 S.W.2d at 312.
97. In Cleghorn, two of the 13 leases had primary terms of 20 years and would have
expired for lack of production within a few months of the appellate court's opinion.
Primary terms of thirty years are common in coal industry leases. Note, Texas No-Term
Leases-Dallas Power and Light Co. v. Cleghorn, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 717,731 (1982). For this
reason, the lessee's delay in Cleghorn could be considered reasonable, notwithstanding'that
the coal leases had been entered into during the 1950s and early 1960s.
98. Implied covenant law has been applied in the uranium industry. In United States
Steel Corp. v. Whitley, 636 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App. 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held that
a uranium lessee had breached its implied covenant duty to act with due diligence in
producing the uranium, using oil and gas cases as precedents. The lessee argued
unsuccessfully that the amount of due diligence required to mine hard minerals was not
nearly as great as that required to mine oil and gas. Id. at 471.
99. WUMS& Mym%supra note 9, § 812; Walker, supra note 8, at418; 5 KUNTZ, supra
note 43, § 52.5.
100. Walker, supra note 8, at 418-19; see also Note, Texas No-Term Leases, supranote 97,
at 723-24.
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commencing a well." The courts nonetheless require that the lessee exercise
its pooling power in good faith."' In Texas, this duty has sometimes been
described as a "fiduciary obligation on the part of the lessee to exercise the
utmost good faith toward the lessor in exercising the power granted under
a pooling provision."" ° At other times, the lessee's exercise of the pooling
power has been judged by the standard of a reasonably prudent operator."'
Whatever the standard, the Texas courts have policed the lessee's pooling
power to protect the lessor against gerrymandered units hastily formed by
lessees who have failed to secure production on the lessor's tract.
Second, many leases grant the lessee the right "at any time" to
remove all property and fixtures placed by lessee on said land. The courts
have held "at any time" to mean "within a reasonable time."' Further,
when removing the casing would be inequitable to the lessor because the
well is still producing, the court has denied the lessee's right to remove
casing in order to preserve the lessor's royalty." s
As shown in the earlier discussion of Cowden v. Broderick & Clavert,
Inc., even when a lease expressly grants the lessee "discretion" over
development decisions, the Texas Supreme Court will continue to police the
0
bargain to determine whether the lessee acted in good faith.1
G. Summary
In general, Texas courts have been very reluctant to allow lessees
to exercise unrestrained discretion over leasehold activity, even when
express language might be interpreted to allow such freedom. The courts
are also reluctant to allow express lease language to bar implied covenants,
unless the intent is clear. Thus, despite the seemingly "plain" lease language
that payment of delay rentals allows the lessee to defer drilling, the delay
rental clause does not bar the implied covenant to drill offset wells. Nor do
express development stipulations bar the implied offset covenant.

101. Elliot v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 223 ('rex. App. 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally
HEUNGWAY, supra note 55, § 7.13; 4 WILAMS & MNEYmL supranote 9, § 670.2 (describing the

'duty of fair dealing" used by the courts to circumscribe lessee's discretionary power to
pool); 1 SMrrH & WEAVR, supra note Z § 4.8(B).
102. Expando Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 407 S.W.2d 254 (rex. App 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 6
WILLIAMS &MYM, supranote 9, §955.
103. Circle Dot Ranch, Inc. v. Sidwell Oil & Gas, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 342 (rex. App. 1995,
writ denied).
104. HmINGWAY, supra note 55, § 7.10.
105. Woodson Oil Co. v. Pruett, 298 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App. 1957, writ ref d n.r.e.); Patton
v. Rogers, 417 S.W.2d 470 (rex. App. 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
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Moreover, the typical express offset clause will not be allowed to
bar the implied duty to offset in a common lessee situation or after the
primary term of a lease has expired. The express offset clause may bar the
implied covenant in a non-common lessee situation, although the case
support for this rule is sparse. If the express offset clause can act as such a
bar, this result is contrary to the equity model and arguably even to the
contract model which generally requires clear language to negate implied
covenants. The typical express offset clause should not bar the implied
covenant because it is not written dearly enough.
The results of most of the cases reviewed in this section would
probably be the same whether the courts adopted the equity model or the
contract model of implied covenants. In some instances, notably the offset
cases and the development case of W.T. Waggoner Estatev. Sigler Oil Co., the
courts' reluctance to find that express clauses bar implied covenants sounds
more in equity than in contract. Despite the seemingly narrow
jurisprudential foundation proclaimed in DancigerOil & Refining Co. ofTexas
v. Powell that implied covenants are to "rest entirely" on the presumed
intention of the parties as actually expressed in the written instrument or as
"necessary" to effectuate the full purpose of the contract, 117the Texas courts
have generally been liberal in imposing implied duties on lessees to the
benefit of lessors. Time and time again, the courts have found that the plain
terms of an express clause are not plain or clear enough to bar the
underlying implied covenants that exist to further the principal purpose of
the lease: to secure oil and gas production and return royalties to the lessor
and profits to the lessee. This judicial posture renders inconsequential the
difference between the equity model and the contract model. This
conclusion supports the Williams' and Meyers' position that implied
covenants derive from the principle of cooperation inherent in the nature
of an oil and gas lease and sounding both in fact and in law. Even without
adopting this position, the Texas cases show that a jurisdiction's formal
adherence to the implied in fact model does not necessarily weaken
the
0
actual protections offered to the lessor by implied covenant law.' 8

107. See quote supra text accompanying note 23.
108. It is somewhat ironic that the jurisdictions which adopted the cooperative venture
model in the market value cases did so to ensure fairness to the lessee, not to the lessor. See
supra text accompanying note 17.
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III. The Implied Covenant to Market
A.

Introduction

The implied marketing covenant has been recognized in Texas from
the oil industry's earliest days. 1' This covenant requires that the lessee use
due diligence to market the oil and gas produced from the lease. Due
diligence includes an obligation to obtain the best price that a reasonably
prudent operator could obtain.110
Most of the marketing covenant cases involve the lessee's efforts to
sell gas rather than oil. The typical lease has a two-pronged gas royalty
clause which requires the lessee to pay royalties based on "market value at
the well" if the gas is sold or used off the premises and to pay the "amount
realized" from the sale if the gas is sold at the wells.
Under an "amount realized" or "proceeds" lease clause, the lessor's
royalty is clearly tied to the lessee's diligence in securing a good sales price
and other terms in its negotiations with the gas purchaser. Lessors have
won some implied covenant cases based on the lessee's failure to market the
gas at the highest possible price under a proceeds lease clause,". and have
lost some of these cases because the lessee was found to have acted as a
reasonably prudent operator."' The issue of whether the "market value"
royalty clause negates the implied covenant to market is discussed below.
Because this Article focuses on when express clauses bar implied covenant
duties, the reader is referred to other sources for detailed discussion of the
implied marketing covenant in general."'

109. See Cole Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 41 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1931);
Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 70 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1934); Poe v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 288 S.W. 264 (rex. App. 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 29 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex.

Comm'n App. 1930); Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908 (rex. App. 1923, writ
dism'd w.o.j.); Morgan v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, 84 S.W.2d 312 (rex. App. 1935); Guleke
v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App. 1939).

110.

HEMINGWAY, supra note 55, § 8.9C; 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 9, § 853; 1

SMITH & WEAvER, supranote 2, § 5.4(B);.5 KUNTZ, supranote 43, § 60.3; MERRILL, supra note

8, § 84.
111. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280 (rex.
App. 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.); Le Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W.2d 190 (rex. App. 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
112. See, e.g., Parker v. TXO Production Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644 (rex. App. 1986, no writ);

Davis v. CIG Exploration, Inc., 789 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1986).
113. See, e.g., Michael P. Irvin, The Implied Covenant to Market in the DeregulatedNatural
Gas Industry, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1 (1996); sources cited supranote 110.
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B. Effect of a Shut-in Royalty Clause
A shut-in royalty clause does not bar the implied covenant to
market. The shut-in clause provides a legal substitute for production in
it does not absolve
paying quantities under the habendum clause of a lease;
4
the lessee from searching diligently for a market."
In interpreting the express language of the shut-in royalty clause,
the courts generally require that the shut-in well be capable of producing
in paying quantities, even though the express lease provision itself does not
say this."' This approach reflects the same underpinning as implied
covenant law: that a lease is for the mutual benefit of both lessee and lessor.
A lessee attempting to hold a lease by paying a shut-in royalty on a well
which is not capable of producing in paying quantities is either speculating
or has delayed too long in commencing a well under the express terms of
the lease's habendum clause.
C. Express Clauses Barring the Implied Duty to Market
Few lease clauses other than the shut-in royalty clause affect the
lessee's duty to market gas."' One Texas case exists, however, in which an

114. HEMINGWAY, supra note 55, § 8.9c; 5 WIuAMs & MEYERS, supra note 9, § 858.2; 1
SMITH & WEAVER, supranote 2, § 5.4(B)(1); 5 KUNrZ, supranote 43, § 60.3; MERRiLL supranote
8, § 84. If the shut-in clause contains a specific time limit on how long shut-ins can be paid,
the lessee has a strong argument that such an express provision establishes a reasonable time
for finding a market without risking an action of breach of the marketing covenant. See also
Bruce M. Kramer & Chris Pearson, The Implied Mar*eting Coenantin Oil and Gas Leases: Some
Needed Changes in the 80s, 46 LA. L REV. 787,801-08 (1986); Robert E. Beck, Shutting-in: For
What Reasons andfor How Long, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 749, 779-85 (1994).
115. Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App. 1960, writ refd n.r.e.).
116. The oil royalty clause of a lease often permits the lessor to take the oil royalty in
kind. Arguably, this oil is then under the control of the lessor and the lessee has no duty to
market it. However, as a practical matter, the typical lessor has neither the expertise nor the
facilities to dispose of his own oil. Most commentators state that the better rule is to imply
a duty to market oil, even when the lease provides for royalty in kind. 5 WI.IAMS & MEYERS,
supranote 9, § 853, at 393-94; 1 SMrrH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 5.4(B)(2). In Cook v. Tompkins,
713 S.W.2d 417 (rex. App. 1986, no writ), the court held that the implied marketing duty did
not require a lessee to make sure that the oil purchaser actually paid the lessor the royalties
owed. The oil purchaser did not have the lessor's address and the accrued royalties owed
were later greatly reduced when the purchaser went into bankruptcy. The lessor sued the
lessee for the lost royalties under the implied duty to market. The court rejected the lessor's
argument because of the "in kind" royalty clause and because the lessor was knowledgeable
in oil and gas matters. Despite Cook, lessees who sell royalty oil may have assumed an
agency relationship which will impose even greater duties on the lessee than those imposed
under implied covenant law. 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 5.4(B)(2), at 281-0. Moreover,
Cook clearly recognizes that the implied covenant to market exists under an "in kind" royalty
clause; the court merely held that the covenant was not breached under the facts of the case.
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express clause was held to negate the implied duty to market. In Gex v.
Texas Co.," 7 the court construed the following provision in a mineral deed
executed by the Gexes as grantors to the Texas Company:
It is agreed that the Texas Company, its successors or assigns,
shall never be under obligation to drill or mine for oil or gas
or other minerals, but that such mining or drilling, both before and after production, shall be wholly at the option of said
grantee .... However, should oil or gas be produced from
said premises in paying quantities by the Texas Company,...
then there shall be paid to grantors... a roalty of one-eighth
(I/) of the interest hereby conveyed ....

The Texas Company drilled one well on the 640-acre tract in which
the Gexes had retained the Ma royalty interest and then committed the gas
from the well to a minimum 25-year sales contract (from 1951 to 1976 and
for an indefinite period thereafter) without the Gexes' consent. The gas was
committed at prices that eventually fell below its market value. The Gexes
filed suit alleging that the Texas Company had not acted as a reasonably
prudent operator in marketing their gas.
The court held that the express clauses quoted above in the mineral
deed barred the implication of any covenants requiring the delivery of gas
in kind or any implied covenant to market. The deed eliminated all duties
to ever drill or mine and the expression "wholly at the option of Grantee"
also eliminated any implied covenant to market. The court distinguished
the "option" language in this case from the "discretion" language in
Cowden' 9 that had been held to substitute a good faith standard for the
reasonably prudent operator standard usually applied in implied covenant
cases.
Furthermore, the Gexes were held to have no right to take royalty
gas in kind because their royalty was phrased in terms of being "paid" to
grantor, and payment means a payment of money. The Texas Company had
paid aof the proceeds received from the gas to the Gexes. The Gexes had
not provided facilities to receive or take any gas in kind, and the Texas
Company therefore had the implied authority by virtue of business usage
and custom to sell and market all the gas for the mutual profit of the
parties.'" The court then went one step further and held that the Gexes had
no cause of action against the Texas Company for using its agency authority
to market the gas at below market value.

117.
118.
119.
120.

337 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App. 1960, writ refd n.r.e.).
Id. at 822.
See quoted Cowden language supra text accompanying note 37.
337 S.W.2d. at 828.
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This case actually foreshadowed (but with quite a different result)
the assertion that lessors would successfully make in Texas Oil & Gas Corp.
v. VelaP2 a few years later: that their market value royalty clauses required
lessees to pay them royalties based on a price higher than the price actually
received by the lessee for the sale of the gas. The court in Gex seemed utterly
unwilling to allow nonparticipating royalty interest owners holding under
a mineral deed to bring such a cause of action. Indeed the court in Gex took
judicial notice of the fact that long-term sales contracts for gas are a
common practice. Summary judgment in favor of the Texas Company was
affirmed.'2
While the court's reluctance to impose the "market value" royalty
problem on lessees in 1960 may be understandable (and the court's
subsequent turnabout in Vela as incomprehensible), much of the Cex court's
reasoning is open to serious criticism. 23 First, the deed expressly committed
only drilling and mining operations to grantee's option. It was silent as to
marketing. The language in the deed can be reasonably interpreted to allow
the grantee complete discretion over the decision to enter into the costly act
of drilling; yet if it drilled, the lessee would then be under an implied
obligation to use reasonable diligence in marketing the production. An
express provision negating certain implied covenants should not be
interpreted as negating other covenants not mentioned."
Second, grantee's exercise of its option to market does not mean it
should be allowed to proceed to market negligently, without regard to the
reasonably prudent operator standard or the interests of the royalty owner.
Again, the court held that the provision that drilling was "wholly at the
option of the Grantee" precluded the implied covenant to market. The court
reasoned that proper development of a lease necessarily involved
marketing, so conversely, an express covenant negating a duty to develop

121. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). In Vela, the lessee had entered into a sales contract In
1935 for the life of the lease under which gas was committed to be sold at 2.3 cents per MCF.
By the 1960s, similar gas in the field was selling for about 13 cents per MCF. The lessors were
owed royalties based on the market price of the gas. The court held that "market price'
clearly meant the prevailing market price at the time of the sale or use of the gas. The gas
was "being sold' at the time it was delivered to the purchaser, not at the time of the gas sales
contract entered into in 1935. Id. at 871. Therefore, under the express terms of the lease, the
lessor was due a 1/8 royalty based on the market price of 13 cents rather than the proceeds
price of 2.3 cents.
122. 337 S.W.2d at 828.
123. 5 WILLAMS & MEYM, supra note 9, § 858.3.
124. For example, the delay rental clause negates the implied covenant to drill an initial
well, but it does not negate the implied covenant to protect against drainage, see supra text
accompanying notes 43-49. Similarly, an express development clause does not negate the
implied covenant to protect against drainage.
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would negate the marketing covenant as well." This reasoning is simply
incorrect.
Third, the express duty in the deed to "pay" a royalty of 1/ would
ordinarily be construed to require the payment of 1/of the market value of
the gas produced and sold from the well. In sustaining the Texas
Company's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the
complaint of sale below market value was irrelevant because the company
had no duty to obtain the market price. A better reasoned decision would
have held that absent an express provision requiring payment based on
market value, the duty to "pay" requires a duty to pay based on proceeds
received, as long as such proceeds reflected the best price that a reasonably
prudent operator could have obtained at the time of contracting with the
gas purchaser.1" Because the Gexes did not have an express market value
royalty clause to claim under,1" the court could easily have entered
judgment for lessee without wreaking havoc on well-established principles
of interpreting implied covenants in leases. In sum, the Gex case is aberrant
and should not be used as a guide to implied covenant analysis in Texas.
D. The Implied Covenant to Market under Market Value Royalty
Clauses
Many commentators have stated that the implied covenant to
market does not exist if royalties are based on market value.28 The existence

125. 337 S.W.2d at 826. The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court in Cowden v.
Broderick & Calvert,Inc., 114 S.W.2d 1166 (Tex. 1938) had distinguished "discretionw from "at
the option of." The first phrase simply lowers the lessee's implied duty to a "good faith"
standard whereas the second negates any implied duty completely. Even assuming a good
faith standard might apply, the court found no evidence of bad faith or improper motive in
Cowden.
126. Alternatively, the court could have adopted the viewpoint of the dissenting justices
in Vela that even under a "market value" royalty clause, the lessee is obligated to pay
royalties based on "proceeds" because of the custom in the industry of selling gas under
long-term contracts. Vela, 429 S.W.2d at 878-81.
127. The royalty owners in Cex had argued, unsuccessfully, that they were owed
royalties expressly based on market value because their royalty clause had been modified
by a communitization (pooling) provision requiring royalties to be paid on the amount
realized or the market value, "whichever is greater." 337 S.W.2d at 824. The court held the
modification to be inapplicable because the lessee had never exercised the right to
communitize.
128. See 5 WILLuAbe & MEYES,rsupra note 9, § 856.3; Bruce M. Kramer & Chris Pearson,
The Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases: Some Needed Changesfor the 80s, 46 LA.
L. REV. 787, 815 n.166 (1986); Thomas A. Harrell, Recent Developments in Nonregulatory
Oil and Gas Law, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS L & TAX'N 327 (1980); Hardwick & Hayes, Gas
MarketingRoyalty Issues in the 1990s, SPECIAL INST. ON OIL & GAS ROYALTIES ON NON-FDERAL

LANDS, 2-1, 2-30 to 2-31 (ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. (1993)); Patrick H. Martin, Implied
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of an express market value clause bars the implied covenant because
lessor's royalties are tied to an external standard rather than to the efforts
of the lessee to market diligently. This prevailing view seems odd in light
of two cases involving Texas leases that do indeed hold that such a
covenant exists under a market value lease (absent an amendatory division
order).
In Shelton v. Exxon Corp.',the lessor won a large judgment against
the lessee for failure to market gas prudently under a market value lease.
Exxon had developed a marketing strategy that sold substantial quantities
of gas from the King Ranch to large customers under corporate warranty
contracts. Unlike leases dedicated to interstate pipeline purchasers under
federal regulation, warranty contracts do not designate the origin of the gas
to be supplied. Exxon simply warranted that it would supply X quantity of
gas at a certain price to its customers.
While Exxon argued that it, its customers, and the King Ranch all
expected the gas contracts to be supplied by the King Ranch gas and that
Exxon needed this gas to fulfill its contracts, these needs and expectations
did not rise to the level of a commitment of the King Ranch gas to the
contracts in question. Thus, the court held that Exxon was legally free to
commit this gas to newer, higher priced contracts. Shelton argued that
Exxon, as a reasonably prudent operator, should have dedicated the King
Ranch gas to new contracts at prices that would have allowed the gas to be
classified under Section 105(b)(2) of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)
rather than Section 109, its ultimate classification. Section 105 gas could be
legally sold at a higher price than Section 109 gas, i.e., the gas had a higher
market value potential as Section 109 gas than as Section 105 gas.
The court found that Exxon, as a reasonably prudent operator,
should have been aware of the imminent passage of the Natural Gas Policy
Act that would classify gas into different categories with different price
ceilings and escalators for each category. Thus, it was imprudent for Exxon
to continue marketing the gas in a manner that limited its market value to
a lower federally controlled price than could have been received. In short,

Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases-Past,Presentand Future,33 WAsHBURm J.639,653- 54 (1994).
129. In addition to the two cases discussed in detail in this Article, see Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1984) opinion set aside and case settled,760 S.W.2d 960
(Tex. 1988). Before setting the appellate opinion aside, the Texas Supreme Court had issued
an opinion in this case, see 31 TEX. S. Cr. J.140 (Dec. 15,1987), affirming in part the judgment
for lessors finding breach of the implied covenant to market under a market value lease.
Upon settlement, the supreme court also withdrew this judgment and opinion.
130. 719 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd on other grounds,921 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991).
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Exxon failed to market its gas at its highest possible market value. Relying
on established Texas cases, 31 the federal court wrote:
Exxon was required to market the King Ranch gas in the
manner reasonably most profitable for the mineral interest
owners and Exxon's operations on the King Ranch leases.
Shelton and the other mineral interest owners cannot be
penalized for Exxon's inability to back its corporate warranty
contracts so long as they did not take part in formulating the
marketing scheme of which those contracts are a part. Nor
should they suffer for Exxon's failure to take the regulatory
environment into account in marketing the gas, if it could
have done so. Since the marketing scheme was Exxon's own,
Exxon is at risk when the prudence of the scheme is judged.
Exxon's failure to [prudently market] can only be
attributed to its interest in fulfilling its corporate warranties
without having to purchase gas on the open market. Exxon's
method of marketing the King Ranch gas completely
subordinated the rights of the mineral interest owners to
Exxon's financial gain. Exxon's acts and omissions in so doing
were not those of a reasonable, prudent operator having its
own and the plaintiff's interests in mind."
Shelton's victory under implied covenant law was short-lived. On
appeal, the court held that Shelton was barred from bringing suit because
he had signed a Settlement Agreement that encompassed this cause of
action. " This ending does not affect the trial court's reasoning about the
implied covenant to market under a market value royalty clause.
Similarly, in Cabot Corp. v. Brown t " the Texas Supreme Court
recognized the existence of the implied covenant to market in a market
value lease, but then held that the implied covenant was barred by express
language in the division order. The supreme court in Cabot described the
implied covenant to market as follows:
Included within the covenant to manage and administer the
lease is the duty to reasonably market the oil and gas
produced from the premises. [citations omitted] This duty is

131. The court primarily relied on: Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563
(rex. 1981), FreeportSulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co. of Texas, 6 S.W.2d 1039 (Tex.
1928), and Amoco ProductionCo. v. FirstBaptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280 (rex. App.
1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
132. 719 F. Supp. at 549.
133. Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 843 F.2d 212,218 (5th Cir. 1988).
134. 754 S.W.2d 104 (rex. 1987).
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also two-pronged: the lessee must market the production with
due diligence and obtain the best price reasonably possible.
Under a gas royalty clause providing for royalties based on
market value, the lessee has an obligation to obtain the best
current price reasonably available."
The factual setting of Cabotis similar to that of Shelton: the lessee
failed to maximize the market value of gas obtainable under federal pricing
regulations. However, the facts in Cabot are somewhat more complex. In
1967, the Browns entered into a market value lease with Cabot. In 1967,
Cabot and Transwestern Pipeline Company entered into a contract called
an "exchange of gas." At that time, interstate prices were higher than
intrastate prices." A well on the lease began production in 1968 and the
Browns signed division orders in January 1968 to receive their share of the
well's production. Under the exchange contract, the Browns' gas was
transported by Cabot through its pipeline to Transwestem's interstate
pipeline system where the gas was commingled with gas to be sold in the
interstate market. At that point, title to the Brown gas passed to
Transwestem.
In exchange, Transwestern delivered an equivalent volume of gas
to Cabot in another Texas county. Cabot used the exchange gas in its own
Texas plant where it was commingled with gas produced or purchased by
Cabot from the intrastate market. Thus, the Browns' gas never really left
Texas.
The majority of the commingled gas which remained after Cabot
processed it in its own plants was sold on the intrastate market at prices
higher than the federal price ceilings. Because this sale of commingled gases
provided a basis for the assertion of Federal Power Commission (FPC)
pricing jurisdiction, in 1975 Cabot sought and obtained a Henshaw
exemption for gas received and consumed within the state. Cabot sold the
Browns' gas for $1.35 per MCF. However, Cabot paid royalties to the
Browns on the basis of the federally regulated price of 38 to 80 cents, the
price apparently received by Cabot from Transwestem at the delivery point
to Transwestem's interstate pipeline.
The Browns brought suit under two causes of action, both alleging
breach of the implied covenant to market. First, they argued that their gas
was not dedicated to interstate commerce and thus was not subject to FPC
pricing jurisdiction. Consequently, the Brown's argued that Cabot was
paying royalties based on a price less than market value, in breach of its
implied marketing duties. Second, the Browns pled in the alternative that,
if the sale was subject to FPC jurisdiction, Cabot had an implied marketing

135. Id. at 106.
136. Id. at 107.
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duty to seek abandonment of the exchange agreement to free the gas for
sale into the higher-priced intrastate market. Brown presented expert
testimony that a reasonably prudent operator would have sought and
obtained an abandonment from the FPC.
Based on a jury finding that Cabot had failed to reasonably market
the gas, the trial court rendered judgment for the Browns. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the gas had not been dedicated to interstate
commerce.!' Brown was awarded $424,000 in damages, based on expert
testimony and evidence of comparable sales by Cabot to purchasers in the
intrastate market. The expert also testified that a reasonably prudent
operator would have sought abandonment on Cabot's behalf, had the gas
been found to be dedicated.
The Browns' victory in the lower courts was as short-lived as
Shelton's was on appeal. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment
for the Browns based on the language of the signed division orders.
E. Express Language in a Division Order Can Bar the Implied
Marketing Covenant: Cabot v. Brown
The Texas Supreme Court in Cabot found it unnecessary to confront
the legal question of whether the Browns' gas was dedicated to interstate
commerce. Similarly, the justices found it unnecessary to reach the issue of
whether a reasonably prudent operator would have sought and obtained
an abandonment of FPC jurisdiction over this gas. Instead, the court held
that the following language in the division order barred the implied
marketing covenant until the lessors revoked the division order:
Payments for gas shall be made to the above-named owners,
... in proportion to their respective interests as shown above
at the then effective price provided in that certain Gas
Contract dated August 15,1967, covering said land, entered
into by and between Cabot Corporation, as seller, and
Transwestern Pipeline Company as buyer,.., or, if such gas
sale be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power
Commission, at the price (rate) finally determined by the
Federal power [sic] Commission to be applicable to the gas
delivered.'"
The supreme court concluded that the Browns were bound by the
interstate prices under its prior holding in Exxon Corp.v. Middleton.!4 The

137. Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 716 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tex. App. 1986, writ granted).
138. Id. at 659.

139. Id.
140. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
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Middleton holding was paraphrased in Cabot as concluding that "division
orders executed by royalty owners, which obligated the lessees to pay
royalties at lower rates than those required under the gas royalty clauses,
were nevertheless binding on the royalty owners until revoked."141 Under
Middleton, although division orders do not supplant the lease contract, they
are binding between the parties for the time and to the extent that they have
been or are being acted on and made the basis of settlements and
paymentsY1
In so holding, the supreme court allowed the language in a division
order to bar an implied covenant in a lease, using as precedent a case
involving settlement of royalty payments by division orders under the
express terms of a lease. The Middleton case did not involve the implied
covenant to market. Rather, it reaffirmed the holding in Vela that a lessee
must pay royalties based on market value when the lease so requires, even
though market value, as measured by the price of similar gas, is much
higher than the proceeds received by the lessee under a long-term gas sales
contract." The Middleton lessors could seek royalties based on the higher
market value of gas only after they revoked the signed division orders
which provided for royalties based on the lower amount realized from the
gas sales. The majority opinion in Cabot failed to distinguish between the
two very different scenarios. Never before had language in a division order
been held to negate an implied covenant duty.
The dissenting opinion in Cabot better reflects the precedent that
existed at the time Cabot was decided. The dissent concluded that the
exchange of gas between Cabot and Transwestem was indeed subject to
FPC jurisdiction (contrary to the holding of the appellate court), but
nonetheless concluded that the lessors should have won under their
alternative theory: that the lessee, as a reasonably prudent operator, could
have secured an abandonment order from the FPC.14 The dissenting
opinion noted that the supreme court had long recognized that a lessee's
implied covenant duties included the duty to seek favorable administrative

141.

Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 107.

142.
143.
144.

613 S.W.2d at 250.
ld.at 244-49.
754 S.W.2d at 111. It is important to note that the majority opinion did not rely on

a finding that the exchange gas was subject to FPC jurisdiction. The majority specifically held
that "[it is unnecessary for us to confront the legal question involving dedication to
interstate commerce." Id. at 106. Thus the majority would have held that the division orders
barred the implied marketing covenant cause of action even if the gas was not subject to the
FPC pricing regulations. The courtfs holding gives the lessee virtually unfettered discretion
to decide whether or not a sale is subject to FPC jurisdiction under a division order which
by its express terms, only allows royalty payments based on the FPC price "if' the gas sale
is subject to the FPC.
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action." Division orders had never been allowed to shield lessees from
underpayments to lessors, especially when the lessee was inequitably
reaping the benefits of FPC jurisdiction at one end of a sales transaction by
paying royalties based on the low interstate price, while selling the gas at
the other end at a much higher intrastate price, not shared with the royalty
owners.
These Texas cases, both under the marketing covenant and other
implied covenants, define the framework within which future disputes over
a lessee's marketing decisions should be analyzed. The next part of this
Article looks at four scenarios likely to arise in the natural gas marketing
context of today.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO MARKET: FOUR
SCENARIOS IN NATURAL GAS MARKETING
A.

The Reverse-Vela Scenario
Lessor's lease requires a royalty based on market value of the
gas sold at the well. Lessee enters into a long-term contract in
the 1970s to sell gas to a pipeline purchaser at $7.00/MCF.
During the 1990s, the price of similar gas drops to
$2.00/MCF. Lessee continues to collect $7.00/MCF from the
purchaser, but pays the lessor a royalty ofl/ of $2.00/MCF.
Has the lessee violated the implied covenant to market?

This scenario is, of course, the reverse-Vela? situation. Under Vela,
reaffirmed in Middleton, the Texas Supreme Court held that a lessee who
entered into a long-term contract to sell gas at $2.00/MCF, followed by an
increase in the price of similar gas to $7.00/MCF, was required to pay
royalties based on the $7.00 price under the express terms of a market value
lease clause. 47
Commentators have uniformly agreed that both logic and fairness
dictate that lessees in the reverse-Vela scenario are free to collect a high
price from the purchaser and account to the royalty owner based on the
lower market value."4 While not usually phrased in this manner, the
reasoning is that the express market value clause in the lease bars any
implied covenant to share the lessee's premium price with the lessor.

145. The leading case is Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
146. Texas Oil & Gas Co. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).

147. Id. The holding in Vela was reaffirmed in Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240.
148.

See, e.g., Irvin, supra note 113.
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As yet, there appears to be no reported case in Texas or elsewhere
addressing this scenario. Anecdotal evidence suggests that lessees playing
out this scenario in the real world are paying lessors based on proceeds
rather than market value, despite the compelling logic of Vela. Why might
this be?" 9 Perhaps it is not so clear that the express market value clause bars
the implied covenant in this situation.
A lessor's own logical reading of the case law on implied covenants
in Texas would advance in a three-step process as follows: First, the lessors
in Vela sued the lessees under two different causes of action: one for breach
of the express market value clause, and the other for breach of the implied
marketing covenant. The trial court found only a breach of the express
clause. The lessees had entered into the long-term gas sales contract in good
faith and had not violated their implied duty to market."' In neither Vela
nor Middleton did the court ever state that a market value clause barred the
implied covenant. Indeed, the Texas courts would have held that the
implied covenant to market does exist under market value leases.
Second, there is no direct conflict between a market value clause
and the implied marketing covenant. Leases are to be construed against
lessees and express clauses are not to bar implied covenants unless the two
are in direct conflict."s There is no illogic in holding that the market value
clause puts an express floor, or minimum price, on the amount due the
lessor, while the implied covenant requires that the lessee pay more than
this minimum if he does better than the market. In essence, the market
value clause is a "starter" clause specifying the minimum duty owed, but
not the maximum due under the implied covenant. 2
Third, the Texas courts have dearly stated that market value can be
determined in several ways. Recently the supreme court decided that,
although evidence of comparable sales may be the most desirable method
of determining market value, it is not the only method. The "netback" or
"workback" formula of using sales proceeds minus the reasonable costs of
transporting to the point of sales is a second method for determining market

149. The Texas division order statute, infra note 154, may partly explain this situation,
at least as to division orders enacted after August 26,1991, the effective date of the statute.
150. Texas Oil & Gas Co. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68,74 (rex. App. 1966, writ granted).
151. See, e.g., Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co. of Texas, 6 S.W.2d
1039 (Tex. 1928); cases cited supra note 52; 5 KuNTz, supra note 43, § 61.2; 5 WILuAMS &
M~ERS, supra note 9, § 826.
152. W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., discussed supratext accompanying notes 40,
81-89 and Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, discussed supra text accompanying notes 60-64 are
precedents for this approach.
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value.'i Following this line of argument, lessors would advance proof that
lessees themselves typically view market value as the price they receive for
the gas sold when making severance tax payments. Further proof may well
show that trade custom and usage in the industry is such that lessees in a
reverse-Vela scenario are in fact paying lessors based on proceeds.
Despite the apparent logic of this three-step analysis, unless the
Texas courts switch from the "plain terms" model to the "cooperative
venture" model of interpreting express clauses in oil and gas leases, royalty
owners in the reverse-Vela situation are not likely to win this case.15 The
express market value clause seems likely to bar the implied covenant duty
in the reverse-Vela context.
B. The "If" Scenario: A Variation on Cabot
Lessee owes royalties to lessor under a proceeds
lease. The lessor has signed a division order with the
following language:
Royalty payments for gas sold shall be based on the
net proceeds realized at the well by lessee. If the gas is
processed in or near the field where produced, royalty

153. Heritage Resources Inc. v. Nationsbank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996). See also Owen
L Anderson, CalculatingRoyalty: 'Costs' Subsequent to Production-FiguresDon't Lie, but.....
33 WAssiumR L.J. 591, 598-606 (1994).
154. A Texas division order statute, enacted in 1991, appears to equate "market value"
with "amount realized." The statutory provision reads as follows:
A division order may be used to clarify royalty settlement terms in the oil
and gas lease ....
[Tihe terms "market value", "market price," "prevailing
price in the field,' or other such language, when used as a basis of
valuation in the oil and gas lease, shall be defined as the amount realized
at the mouth of the well by the seller of such production in an arm's length
transaction.
2 Tsx. NAT. REs.CODE ANN. § 91.402(i) (Vernon 1993).
This statutory provision seems to codify the holding in Middleton that division orders
basing payments on amount realized are binding until revoked; the lessor who is owed
market value royalties under the terms of the lease must first revoke the proceeds division
order. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). The Middleton opinion, when
issued in 1981, assisted lessees coping with the "plain terms" jurisprudence of Vela's
definition of market value. In 1991, the price of natural gas at the wellhead was $1.59 per
MCF, having fallen substantially since 1984. Annual Energy Review 1991, Table 81, p. 181
(Energy Information Administration). By 1991, many lessees had'signed long-term gas sales
contracts with contract prices substantially above this level. Thus, in 1991, it was
advantageous to royalty owners to receive royalties based on proceeds from contracts at
above-market prices rather than the market value reflected in the spot market price for gas.
The 1991 pricing situation was the reverse of that which existed when Vela and Middleton
were decided in 1968 and 1981 respectively. In 1991, lessees, not lessors, would want to
revoke division orders based on proceeds and pay lessors the lower market price for gas.
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payments shall be based on the net proceeds received at the
well, as determined by the agreement between the producer
and the processor.
The lessor brings a cause of action for breach of the
implied marketing covenant alleging that the lessee has
imprudently processed the gas rather than sold it in
unprocessed form. The lessee's decision to process is driven
by the lessee's ownership interest in the processing plant and
its desire to maximize processing profits.
This scenario is designed to focus attention on the Cabot opinion
that held that the express language in a division order barred the implied
marketing covenant until the division order was revoked." As we have
seen, the Texas courts generally will not lightly displace implied lease
covenants unless such covenants are inconsistent with an express clause
clearly intended to embrace the lessee's entire duty under the implied
covenant.
In light of this framework analysis, Cabot majority opinion is
wrongly decided. Nothing in either the Cabot division order or in the
analogous one above suggests that the lessee's decision to trigger the "if"
provision is immune from review under implied covenant law. The "if"
provision clearly places discretionary power in the lessee, a power that
brings with it an implied duty to use the power wisely, absent clear
language to the contrary.
Unless Cabot is overruled, royalty owners must seek ways to
minimize its effect on implied covenant litigation. The Cabot majority
opinion distinguished its own holding from prior rulings that division
orders do not, as a general rule, relieve the lessee of a duty to market gas as
a reasonably prudent operator.' These precedents strongly suggest that the
Cabot opinion does not apply to division orders or leases which expressly
require royalty payments based on proceeds, as in the scenario described
above.
Thus, the Cabot opinion should be limited to hold that the express
language of division orders can bar the implied marketing covenant only
in the case of a "market value" royalty clause. The Middleton/Cabot
sequence of cases arose from the litigious and complicated issues of
determining market value under federal pricing regulations in jurisdictions

155. Cabot v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104 (rex. 1987).
156. The court distinguished Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579
S.W.2d 280 (Tex. App. 1979, writ refd n.r.e) and Le Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W.2d 190
(rex. App. 1957, writ refd n.r.e.). In Amoco, the particular division order at issue referred to
proceeds at the well and did not change the lease royalty clause also based on proceeds. In
Le Cuno, the division order based on proceeds was held to require the lessee to exercise good
faith in any contract it entered disposing of the royalty owners' gas.
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hewing to the Vela rule that market value may differ radically from the
proceeds actually received by lessees. The Cabot court held that Middleton
was controlling in its language that division orders are binding "for the time
and to the extent that they have been or are being acted on and made the
basis of settlements and payments."" s This language in Middleton is actually
taken from the language in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Williams." The Phillips
language is directly tied to the need for clarity about what is "market
value:"
The very existence of this and the other numerous other
litigations which have arisen over the meaning and effect of
market price or rate provisions and over what was the market
price or value of the gas, and the fact that these agreements
[the division orders] fix, as due, sums which may from time
to time be more or less than the prevailing market price, give
full support to and make binding payments and settlements
thereunder. 59
Under this reasoning, the Middleton/Cabotsequence of holdings is
simply not applicable to proceeds leases at all. I would argue further that
the sequence is not applicable in any scenario other than the determination
of market value in a price-regulated industry."W In today's deregulated
environment, Cabot should be treated as a dead letter.
C. The Index Pricing Scenario
Lessee owes lessor royalties based on a market value lease
clause. Lessee accounts to lessor for royalties based on the
nearest market hub price of $2.00 per MCF minus

157. 754 S.W.2d at 107.
158. 158 F.2d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1946).

159. Id.
160. The Cabot holding may also be limited to the fact situation in which the lessee's
initial marketing decision was prudent when first made. Arguably, the lessee in Cabot had
acted prudently in entering into the 1967 contract with the pipeline purchaser because at that
time interstate prices were higher than intrastate prices, a fact specifically noted by the court.
Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 107. Had the price differential been reversed, the court might have
found breach of the implied marketing duty. Still, this fact makes the Cabot opinion even
more difficult to explain: Why should a lessee not be held to act as a reasonably prudent
operator throughout the term of the lease? Such an operator should continue to monitor the
price differential and seek FPC abandonment if intrastate prices became higher than
interstate prices, unless the cost of doing so would exceed the benefits. It is quite clear why
Cabot did not seek FPC action; it was reaping the benefits of the price differential without
having to share the differential with the lessors. Such self-dealing has always been
condemned in implied covenant law. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563
(Tex. 1981); FirstBaptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280.
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transportation expenses from the wellhead to the hub of 30
cents per MCF. The royalty payments are independent of the
proceeds actually received by lessee from the sale of this gas.
Lessor brings suit arguing that this market hub price is not
the best price that the lessee could have received; indeed the
lessor has proof that the lessee's proceeds, netted back to the
well, are higher than the netback hub price.
The lessor's cause of action in this law suit can be characterized in
two ways: first, as an action under the express clause of the lease; and
second, as a cause of action under implied covenant law. The first battle will
be fought through expert testimony about which market hub, if any, sells
gas comparable in time, quantity, quality and end use to the lessor's gas."
The implied covenant battle will be fought on a different playing
field. The lessee will first argue that no implied covenant exists under a
market value royalty clause. This oft-cited principle is too broadly stated.
While it may apply in a reverse-Vela situation, the principle does not apply
when the lessee has discretion to choose the classification category (as the
lessees in Shelton and Cabot could do under federal price controls) or to
choose the market index price that will define market value. The lessee's
exercise of this discretion is subject to the reasonably prudent operator
standard.
Thus, if the lessee elects to value the royalty gas at one market hub,
yet the lessee is actually selling the gas at another market hub where it is
both valued and sold at a higher price, this lessee may have violated the
reasonably prudent operator standard.
The implied marketing covenant will also arise in this scenario if
the lessee is a vertically integrated major or one of the new mega-marketers
and is manipulating the index used to value royalty gas. The published
price indices used as a marker of market value are deficient in many
respects. 62 Participation by producers in reporting prices to the survey
collectors is voluntary. Producers may not want to reveal competitive price
information either for antitrust or strategic business reasons. It is most often
the large vertically integrated major producers and marketers who decline
to participate in the price surveys. These majors buy and sell enormous
quantities of gas at prices which may not enter into the published surveys.
This scenario presents an obvious opportunity for producer/marketers to
sell at an unreported price above the market hub price, while basing their
royalties on the hub's reported price. Even a difference of a penny between

161. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240,246-49 (Tex. 1981) for a discussion of
the methodology of determining market value.
162. Craig R. Carver, Natural Gas PriceIndices: Do They Providea Sound Basisfor Sales and
Royalty Payments?,42 ROCKY MTN. NUN. L. IMSr. 10-15,10-16 (1996).
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the hub's reported price and the mega-marketer's actual price can result in
millions of dollars of underpaid royalties.
In one of the class action suits currently undergoing the class
certification process in the Texas courts, the producer and its marketing
affiliates used an "index formula" as the basis for paying royalty owners.
The producer first calculated a wellhead index price by taking an average
of three published price surveys for gas sold at transportation delivery
points and netted this price back to the wellhead. It then compared this
wellhead index price with the "market realization" price that it actually
received in sales to third parties. The producer then compared the two
figures and applied this rule: If "market realization" was greater than the
index price, settle at index. If "market realization" equaled the index price,
settle at index. If "market realization" was less than index price, settle at
"market realization" minus two cents." This formula is a "heads lessee
wins, tails lessor loses" game.
Conduct such as this will provide ample opportunity for implied
covenant law in the new world of index pricing. Whether the lease royalty
clause is based on market value or proceeds, the lessee has an implied duty
to market gas on the best possible terms. Constructing an index formula or
manipulating market indices in a manner which sets the lessor's royalty at
a lower price than the lessee is actually receiving violates this principle.
D. The Take-or-Pay Scenarios
Scenario One: A lessee bargains with its pipeline-purchaser
for a buy-down of the purchaser's take-or-pay contract with
the producer. The lessee is offered a cash payment of $2
million in exchange for reducing the price of gas from
$7.00/MCF to $3.00/MCF. The lessee counters with an offer,
which is accepted by the purchaser, to reduce the price of gas
to $2.50/MCF in exchange for receiving a cash payment of $4
million. The lessee owes the lessor royalty under a "proceeds"
or "amount realized" royalty clause.
Scenario Two: A pipeline-purchaser breaches its
contract to buy gas from a producer at $7.00/MCF under a
take-or-pay contract. The producer sues and during the
litigation sells the gas subject to the contract on the spot
market for $2.00/MCF to mitigate damages. Ultimately, the
parties settle the take-or-pay dispute in a buy-out that
terminates the contract in exchange for a cash settlement. Part
of the $6 million cash settlement represents the projected

163. Altheide v. Meridian Oil Inc., Cause #92-026182, 113th Judicial District Court of
Harris County, Tex., Motion for Class Certification filed Sept. 23,1996.
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difference between the $7.00/MCF contract price and the
market price of gas over the remaining term of the contract,
including the two years of litigation during which the gas was
actually sold on the spot market.
The lessee's conduct in the first scenario strongly suggests that the
lessee has breached its implied marketing duty to its royalty interest
owners. The lessee has not sought to market the gas at its highest possible
price considering the interests of both the lessee and lessor. The lessee has
traded a lower price of gas for a cash benefit that will not be shared with
royalty owners, in a self-dealing manner."6 No express clause would appear
to bar subjecting this lessee's judgment to the reasonably prudent operator
standard.
The second scenario is a simplified version of TransAmerican Natural
Gas Corp.v.Finkelstein." In Finkelstein,an overriding royalty interest owner
sought a share of the settlement proceeds on natural gas actually produced
before the buy-out of the take-or-pay contract. Finkelstein essentially
argued that the lessee had received two prices for the produced gas: first,
the spot market price; and second, the difference between the contract price
and the spot market price as settlement proceeds. Finkelstein argued that
under implied covenant law and a proceeds lease, a lessee must share with
its lessor the combined high price for gas which the lessee has in fact
received on gas actually produced.
While the opinion in Finkelsteinoften uses the words "lease" and
"lessee" to describe the relationship between Finkelstein and the producer,
TransAmerican, the relationship was not one of lessee to lessor. Rather,
Finkelstein was an overriding royalty interest owner who had earned the
right to certain percentages of gas produced and sold from the La Perla
Ranch through his successful efforts to secure for TransAmerican the
mineral rights under this ranch. The original '/16 overriding royalty interest
was defined as "equivalent to '/16 of the net revenue interest" from all such
mineral rights.16' Finkelstein later acquired an additional overriding royalty
interest through a settlement of his claims against TransAmerican in
TransAmerican's bankruptcy proceedings. This additional override was
phrased in the following terms:

164. See, e.g., FirstBaptist Churchof Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280. See also Manges v. Guerra,673
S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984) for an analogous breach of the duty owed by the executive right
owner to a nonexecutive mineral interest owner.
165. 933 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App. 1996) (en banc opinion dated August 14, 1996,
overturning the original three-judge panel opinion issued in April 1996 which had affirmed
the trial court's judgment in favor of the royalty interest owner under implied covenant law).
166. Id. at 593-94.
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[A]n overriding royalty interest of one and one-half percent
(1 %) of all oil, gas, [and] other hydrocarbons... produced
and saved from or attributed to the interests owned by
oil and gas lease ... ,
[TransAmerican] ...
in and to all (i) ...
(ii) development agreements, joint development agreements,
farm-out agreements,. . . net revenue interest agreements,
and, without exception, all other agreements which have as
their purpose or will involve or be concerned with the
exploration, drilling and/or production of oil [or] gas, ... and
(iii) all other interests in land, including, but not limited to fee
mineral interests, royalty interests, overriding royalty
and other
interests, net profits interests, production payments
167
similar interests in production of oil [or] gas.
The original panel opinion in Finkelstein carefully threaded its way
around previous cases in which royalty owners had been defeated in their
efforts to secure a share of take-or-pay proceeds. None of these cases had
presented the issue of whether the implied marketing covenant required a
lessee to pay its lessor a share of take-or-pay settlement proceeds on gas
actually produced after a purchaser had repudiated the take-or-pay contract
and then was made to pay "repudiation" damages for the breach.
Finkelstein argued, quite successfully at first, that when a purchaser
breached a take-or-pay contract and the producer first sold the
"repudiated" gas on the spot market (for, say $2.00/MCF) and then
received substantial damages equal to the difference between the spot price
and the contract price (say, $7.00/MCF) on that produced gas, the
producer/lessee owed its lessor a share of the repudiation damages under
implied covenant law. Every lessee owes its lessors the duty to market at
the highest possible price and this duty requires sharing the highest price
received for the produced gas, including any repudiation damages.
Following the lead of several commentators, the original panel
opinion distinguished nonrecoupable buyouts from other types of take-orpay proceeds:
When a buyer breaches its take-or-pay obligation and
compensates for its breach with take-or-pay damages, the gas
remains committed to the contract and stays in the
ground ....
A royalty interest dependent upon production is
therefore not owed at the time the take-or-pay payment is
made. Rather royalty is owed when the buyer actually takes
the gas pursuant to its contractual make up right, and its
account is credited with the corresponding amount of the
take-or-pay damages. But if the buyer repudiates the contract,

167. Id. at 597-98.
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and the seller mitigates its damages by producing and selling
gas to third parties at the spot market price, the gas is gone.
If royalty is not owed on the seller's repudiation damages, the
royalty owner will never recover royalty on the price
effectively received for the gas produced and sold on the spot
market during the period of repudiation. Repudiation
damages are thus in the nature of a nonrecoupable
"buyout." 6 s
A few months after the panel opinion was issued, Finkelstein's
victory was overturned in an en banc opinion on motion for rehearing. A
majority of four justices held that Finkelstein was not entitled to any part of
the take-or-pay proceeds. The three judges who had decided the original
panel opinion in Finkelstein's favor filed their panel opinion as a dissent.
The majority opinion in the en banc Finkelsteinbegins the analysis
part of its ruling by citing DancigerOil & Refining Co. of Texas v. Powelff for
the principle that courts are not to read additional provisions into a lease. 17°
Because Finkelstein, an experienced independent producer, could have, but
did not, specifically included a provision that allowed for royalty to be paid
on proceeds from take-or-pay settlements, Finkelstein could not recover on
this basis. The court appears to hold that the lack of express language in
Finkelstein's grant bars any implied covenant from securing to him the
highest price received by his lessee.
Unlike Danciger, however, the court did not explain why the
language of Finkelstein's specific contracts failed to show a dominant
purpose to obtain royalties on gas produced at the highest price received by
the lessee. Furthermore, Danciger does not stand for the proposition that
courts should not read additional provisions into a lease. Rather its holding
is that "covenants will be implied in fact when necessary to give effect to the
actual intention of the parties as reflected by the contract or conveyance as
construed in its entirety in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made and the purposes sought to be accomplished thereby. " "'
The court in Danciger refused to read an implied covenant to
develop into the specific terms of Danciger's royalty grant. It found that
Danciger had received a large cash payment as consideration for conveying
a mineral deed. The court stated that mineral deeds usually do not have
development as their dominant purpose; they are investment vehicles.
Moreover, in Danciger,the deed expressly stated that the grantee/operator
was only subject to a duty to protect against drainage and to no other duty.

168. Id. at 608 (citing I SMrH & WEAVER, supra note 2, § 4.6(E)(6)(b), at 215-1 to 215-4).
169. 154 S.W.2d 632 (rex. 1941).
170. 933 S.W.2d at 597.
171. 154 S.W.2d at 635.
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By way of contrast, Finkelstein's only compensation for his efforts
in securing mineral interests for TransAmerican were the overriding
royalties."7 No language in Finkelstein's grants showed any hint of
reducing or negating the implied covenant to market. Indeed royalties
based on "net revenues" or "proceeds" suggest just the opposite, a
dominant purpose of obtaining the highest price possible. Far from being
exclusionary and was not limited to the list of typical industry agreements
(such as farmouts). Instead, it included, "without exception, all other
agreements which have as their purpose or will involve or be concerned
with" the exploration or production of oil or gas. It is difficult to argue that
73
take-or-pay payments are not "concerned" with the production of gas.
Instead of analyzing the express language of the Finkelstein royalty
provision and the circumstances surrounding its creation (other than
Finkelstein's expertise in oil and gas matters), the majority opinion stated
the following propositions as "one-liners" from past cases:
a. "The lessee's royalty obligations are determined from lease
agreements executed prior to and wholly independent of gas
purchase contracts. The royalties are fixed and unaffected by
the gas contracts," citing Middleton. 4
b. "Take or pay is not a benefit which flows from the
marketing covenant of a lease," citing Mandell v. Hamman Oil
& Refining Co.175
c. "[Tihe pay option under a take-or-pay contract is not a
payment for the sale of gas. Rather it is a payment for the
exclusive dedication of reserves for a fixed period of time,"
citing Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas PipelineCo.176
Yet each of these one-liners seems an inaccurate snapshot of the
holdings in the cited cases. Surely royalties are crucially affected by the gas

172. In United States Steel Corp. v.Whitley, 636 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App. 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), the court held that a uranium lessee owed implied covenant duties to an overriding
royalty interest owner; the court found Dancigerinapplicable because it involved a mineral
deed, not a lease. Id. at 474. The court upheld the judgment for the overriding royalty
interest owner even though the conveyance creating the override stated that uranium
operations "shall be at the will of the assignor."
173. Curiously, neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in the en banc opinion
differentiate between Finkelstein's first grant of a royalty based on a "net revenue interest"
and the second grant which added an additional 1.5 per cent royalty applied to a much
broader base of revenues.
174. 613 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1981), cited in Finkelstein,933 S.W.2d at 598.
175. 822 S.W.2d 153,165 (rex. App. 1991, writ denied), cited in Finkelstein, 933 S.W.2d at
600.
176. 925 S.W.2d 565,570 (Tex. 1996), cited in Finkelstein,933 S.W.2d at 598.
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contract entered into by a lessee.' The Middleton opinion simply holds that
the royalties payable to a lessor under an express market value clause may
differ from the royalties due based on proceeds. Middleton says nothing
about implied covenant law.
The quotation from Mandell also seems inappropriate in that the
next line in the Mandell opinion reads that "Hamman was required to obtain
for appellants [royalty owners] only benefits received that were related to
the sale of gas that had been produced."" The holding of Mandell is that
production is the key to royalty, a proposition that neither side disputed in
Finkelstein. Moreover, the statement that take-or-pay is "not a benefit which
flows from the marketing covenant" is much too broad. A lessee who failed
to negotiate a take-or-pay provision in a gas purchase contract at a time
when all other producers in a field were doing so would surely have
violated the reasonably prudent operator standard. This lessee's gas would
probably be the first to be cut back by a purchaser when demand fell
because the purchaser would suffer no liability for not taking this gas vis-avis gas from the other producers in the field with take-or-pay contracts.
In addition, the en banc Finkelsteinopinion fails to acknowledge that
the lessors in Hamman received damages for their pricing claims against
their lessee. The lessee, Hamman Oil, had sued its pipeline-purchaser,
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, for breach of its sales contract. In 1983,
Tennessee refused to take more than half of the gas that Hamman could
produce and, in addition, reduced the contract price to the minimum lawful
rate for interstate gas. Hamman asserted claims for Tennessee's
unauthorized price reductions on the gas that was taken and for drainage
caused by Tennessee's violation of the ratable take provision in the
contract."8 Tennessee ultimately paid eight million dollars to settle all of
Hamman's claims. Hamman itself determined that the royalty owners were
due a portion of this settlement that reflected recovery for the price
reduction on the gas produced and for the drainage claimsIW The Finkelstein
court does not explain why lessors may receive royalties on pricing
settlements due to price reductions by the original pipeline purchaser, but
are not due royalties on pricing settlements when the original purchaser has
repudiated the contract and the gas is then sold on the spot market to other

177. For example, a lessee who signs a gas contract to sell gas for 50 cents when a
reasonably prudent operator would sell for $1.00 is crucially affected by the lessee's failure
to act competently.
178. 822 S.W.2d at 165.

179. Id. at 157.
180.

Id.
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purchasers. Certainly, it is not clear what "plain language" sustains this
result."'
The court's reading of Lenape on the nature of take-or-pay seems to
be the key to the court's decision. The Finkelstein court viewed the
repudiation damages as an award for nonproduction, for gas not taken or
paid for under the gas purchase agreement."8s The award represented the
compromise of a dedication claim that existed independently of the lease.
Thus, even though the gas was in fact produced, no royalties were due on
it.
The Finkelstein court also failed to examine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the growth of take-or-pay contracts in the 1970s.
During this decade of severe gas shortages, the federal government
extensively regulated gas prices so that pipeline purchasers were not free
to compete for sales from producers on the basis of price. Increasingly,
purchasers competed on the basis of other terms in the purchase contracts,
notably the take-or-pay provision." Viewed in this manner, the settlement
of a take-or-pay provision for repudiation damages is difficult to divorce
from a lessee's implied obligation to pay the highest price received on
production from a lease. Take-or-pay clauses were a substitute for higher
prices, so a share of repudiation damages for breach of this clause would
compensate the lessor for this trade-off.'

181. In Hamman, neither party contested the payment of royalties to lessors based on the
pricing and drainage claims. It appears from anecdotal evidence that many lessees, like
Hamman, have read implied covenant law to require these payments. If these payments
amount to trade custom and practice, it is indeed odd to find a court stating so broadly that
'take or pay is not a benefit which flows from the marketing covenant of a lease."
182. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein, 933 S.W.2d 591,597-99 (Tex. App.
1996).
183. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL& GAS LAW INA NUTSHELL 288-90 (3d ed. 1995).
184. Even the Lenape court recognized that take-or-pay contracts are integrally related
to a lessee's production. This court viewed the "central purpose" of take-or-pay clauses as
allocating the risk of market demand fluctuations to the buyer; invalidating such contracts
would shift the market risk back to the producer and "inevitably chill exploration and
production." Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d 565, 572
(rex. 1996). The Lenape court could hardly fail to recognize the relationship between implied
covenant law and the take-or-pay clause, given the facts of the case. The dispute between
Lenape and the pipeline originated because Lenape's lessors had become unhappy with the
low production and revenues received from two wells on their lease. When the price and
demand for gas plummeted in the early 1980s, Tennessee Gas sent notice to all its producers
that it would reduce its purchases and prices and not honor its take-or-pay obligations with
producers who refused to amend their contracts with the pipeline. Lenape had little reason
to drill or develop new wells under these conditions. Lenape's lessors sued for breach of the
implied covenant to develop their tract and for failure to produce in paying quantities.
Lenape settled the lawsuit by agreeing to pool part of the committed acreage with adjacent
property. After pooling, Lenape entered into a farm-out with Tesoro and Coastal. Tesoro
then drilled new wells which boosted the productive capacity of the leased acreage, greatly
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Ironically, a federal district court in Mississippi, relying on the
original panel opinion in Finkelstein, held that royalty owners could share
in nonrecoupable take-or-pay settlements.'8 ' This court thought that the
Texas panel opinion had followed the dictates of Dancigerand had awarded
royalties to Finkelstein based on "the Texas courts' literal interpretations of
lease language" under the plain terms model of jurisprudence.' "

Clearly, "plain terms," are not so plain.
The Texas Supreme Court will likely review FinkeIstein. In that
event, the court will have to engage in a more careful analysis of the
language and circumstances surrounding the creation of the Finkelstein
royalties, if the court is to remain true to the spirit of DancigerOil & Refining
Co. of Texas v. Powell and many of the other cases discussed in this Article.
What is there in the language and circumstances of Finkelstein's net
revenue interests which negates the existence of an implied covenant to
share that part of the take-or-pay judgment based on the highest price
received by the lessee for gas actually produced? Is the circumstance of
Finkelstein's status as an experienced oil and gas operator determinative?
Is a "net revenue interest" so well defined in the oil and gas industry that
no one would expect it to include any part of a take-or-pay settlement? Are
overriding royalty interest owners to be treated differently from lessors
under a lease, because the inherent nature of an override is somehow
riskier?
If the judgment against Finkelstein is ultimately upheld, premised
on Finkelstein's status and the peculiar language of his grant, then ordinary
lessors owning royalties based on the "amount realized" from gas
production under a typical lease might succeed in a similar lawsuit, despite
Finkelstein's loss." 7
No lessor is likely to succeed, however, if the Finkelstein opinion is
ultimately premised on the inherent nature of a take-or-pay provision in a
gas sales contract as being completely divorced from a lessee's duty to act
as a reasonably prudent operator in marketing gas under an oil and gas
exacerbating the take-or-pay dispute between Lenape and its pipeline purchaser. Id. at 568,
572.
185. Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
186. Id. at 1169-70. See also dissenting Justice Rickhoff s parting shot in Finkelstein on
denial of Finkelstein's motion for rehearing. 933 S.W.2d at 611 (characterizing the majority
opinion as a "tortured climb" over the express language of the lease).
Finkelstein had successfully pleaded an alternative cause of action based on unjust
enrichment in the trial court. The en banc appellate opinion reversed recovery on this
equitable claim because no implied or quasi-contract can arise if the subject is covered by an
express contract, especially one entered into by sophisticated parties. Id. at 600.
187. As noted, the court in Finkeisteinseemed to go out of its way to frame the dispute
between Finkelstein and TransAmerican as one between lessee and lessor, as if to discourage
any further lawsuits by lessors.
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lease. The appellate court's string of one liners from Middleton, Mandell, and
Lenape then earns the Finkelstein result a one-liner of its own: "the revenge
of Vela." Once the supreme court majority in Vela interpreted the express
royalty clause in a lease such that lessors' royalties were no longer tied to
the lessee's prudently negotiated gas sales contract, a crack appeared in the
cooperative model of an oil and gas lease. Not surprisingly, this
development posted danger signs to implied covenant law that is closely
tied to the cooperative nature of the lease.
If Texas precedent is carefully honored in the supreme court's
review of Finkelstein, this crack should not become a hole. Whether
Finkelstein wins or loses at the highest level, the supreme court should
engage in reasoned analysis, based on the express language and all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the contract as required under Danciger.
Such an analysis should avoid stringing "one-liners" together in a
misleading manner that will undoubtedly cause mischief and instability in
the law for years to come.
Texas has a long jurisprudential history of oil and gas law that has
consistently honored the cooperative nature of the oil and gas lease, albeit
while adopting the "implied in fact" contract model of implied covenants.
In many instances, lessors have won implied covenant cases despite what
appear to be "plain terms" in favor of the lessee. The Texas courts have
shown a noted reluctance to allow express language to bar implied
covenants, except when the two are in direct conflict and the express clause
is clear. Put simply, the "plain terms" model of interpretation of express
clauses in leases does not ordain that express clauses be read broadly to bar
implied covenants in oil and gas leases.
In the end, the ultimate lesson of Finkelstein is that the "plain terms"
model of the oil and gas lease is difficult to apply and conceptually inferior
to the cooperative model in describing the relationship between lessors and
lessees. Terms in dispute are hardly ever "plain," nor do contract terms
arise in a vacuum devoid of context. Yet, under either model, arguments
can be advanced both for and against the sharing by royalty interest owners
in take-or-pay settlements."r The task for the Texas Supreme Court is to
advance its arguments coherently while remaining true to the jurisprudence
of implied covenant law discussed in this Article.

188. The arguments on both sides are presented in Lowe, supra note 14; at 244-64,
266-67. Professor Lowe's article analyzes whether take-or-pay payments should be shared
by royalty owners under the express terms of their leases and does not purport to examine
the related issue of the scope of implied covenants. Id. at 229. Despite the thoroughness of
his analysis, the article does not discuss the Finkelstein scenario wherein royalties are sought
on take-or-pay settlements for gas actually produced, either under the express terms of a
lease or under implied covenant law.

Spring 1997]

BARRING IMPLIED COVENANTS

V. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
Implied contract law is not dead in Texas. Its principles will be
applied to new marketing scenarios, such as those illustrated in this Article
in the natural gas marketing context. Implied covenant law is intensely fact
specific in its application. A lessee must act as a reasonably prudent
operator would under similar facts and circumstances considering the
interests of both the lessor and the lessee. The facts and circumstances that
will bear most strongly on the evaluation of the lessee's conduct in the new,
deregulated environment set a research agenda for the upcoming
millennium. I predict that lawyers interested in implied covenant issues will
become students of many other bodies of knowledge, including:
1. Corporate law. When does the marketing affiliate of a producer
fall into the alter ego doctrine such that the transactions between marketer
and producer are treated as sham sales or as sales that do not reflect market
value?
2. Antitrust law. Will the gains of moving from a regulated to a
deregulated industry be thwarted by the mega-mergers that are now
occurring between large marketers and producers? Will the problem of
pipeline monopoly power shift from the interstate market of open access to
unregulated local gathering lines? Empirical studies of hub markets, of the
degree of competition in regional natural gas markets, and of the statistical
validity of the price indices used to determine market value will become
part of the oil and gas lawyer's required reading. State oil and gas
commissions and attorneys general are also likely to take an active interest
in these matters.
3. Class certification procedures. Increasingly, royalty interest
owners are pursuing claims against their lessees through class action suits
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of royalty interest owners. Will these
owners be able to meet the procedural requirements for class certification?
4. Commercial law. The Uniform Commercial Code's emphasis on
good faith in contract performance seems to embrace the doctrine of
implied covenants. Yet good faith has "atrophied" as a contract doctrine in
Texas.' What impact will the doctrine of good faith in non-oil and gas
cases have on oil and gas jurisprudence?
5. Law and Economics. "Law and economics" scholars have urged
the courts to impose a higher standard of scrutiny on long-term relational
contracts or contracts using open terms when the interests of the parties
under such contracts diverge. The oil and gas lease is often used as the

189. See Mark P. Gergen, A CautionaryTale about ContractualGood Faith in Texas, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 1235 (1994).,
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paradigm of such long-term contracts'c Will the courts adopt the "rule of
joint maximization" and other reforms suggested by these scholars as
guidelines for enforcing and interpreting implied covenants in oil and gas
leases?
This research agenda will keep implied covenant law alive and well
into the twenty-first century.

190. See, e.g., Mark P. Geen, The Use ofOpen Ternms inContract, 92 COLuMBRA L REV. 997
(1992); Charles J.Goetz & Robert & Scott, Pincpes ofRelational Contrat, 67 VA. L REV. 1089
(1981); Charles J. Meyers & Steven M. Crafton, The Covenant of Further Exploration-Thirty
Years Later, 32 ROCKY M"N.MIN. L. INSt. 1-1 (1986).

